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ABSTRACT
This dissertation includes two essays on ambiguity and stock return volatility. The first essay
focuses on the degree of ambiguity in the firm news, and studies the impact of ambiguous informa-
tion regarding dividends and earnings on stock prices. Two proxies are constructed for firm-level
ambiguity, measuring qualitative and uncertain aspects of news. The central finding is that stock
prices react more strongly to bad news than good news. In addition to the asymmetric effect docu-
mented, the magnitude of this effect is larger as news becomes more ambiguous. Results are robust
to alternative explanations. Taken together, these findings provide empirical evidence consistent
with the theory of ambiguity aversion, and show that firm-specific ambiguity matters for financial
decision making.
The second essay, coauthored with Hwagyun Kim, studies the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL)
puzzle. Recent studies find stock returns are negatively related to IVOL. We find that aggregate
variables known to explain stock market volatility affect the IVOL and portfolio returns sorted
by IVOL. Macroeconomic volatilities, yield spreads, dividend yield, trading volume and common
factors of earnings forecast dispersions are important drivers of IVOL. Macro factors produce the
negative pattern, consistent with theories of intertemporal hedging demand. Teasing out the com-
mon IVOL part, the residual IVOL is positively and significantly related to stock returns and the
idiosyncratic portions of earnings forecast dispersions. This is consistent with ambiguity aversion
and incomplete market hypotheses.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation includes two essays on ambiguity and stock return volatility. The first essay,
"In the Face of Ambiguity: Investors’ Reactions to News", focuses on ambiguity in the news. Two
proxies from the firm news are used to test the hypotheses of how investors react to ambiguous
information based on the theory of Epstein and Schneider (2008). The first proxy uses the idea
that soft information is harder to interpret than hard information, and the second proxy focuses on
the frequency of vague and uncertain words used in the corporate news. As Epstein and Schnei-
der (2008) point out in their model, when the information has a particular type of uncertainty,
Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, ambiguity-averse agents treat bad news as more relevant and
precise than good news. Therefore they react to the information asymmetrically - they respond
more strongly to bad news than good news. Consistent with their theory, I find the asymmetry
effect. Investors react 25.2 bps more to bad news than good news. Besides, as news becomes more
ambiguous, the asymmetry effect is larger. It suggests that investors place more weight on bad
news than good news, which is consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion.
The second essay, "Ambiguity, Macro Factors, and Stock Return Volatility", coauthored with
Hwagyun Kim, focuses on the idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) puzzle. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006) find that monthly stock returns are negatively related to the idiosyncratic volatility
in the previous month. We study the extent to which idiosyncratic volatility measured by Ang,
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) are decomposed into common and idiosyncratic parts, using
observable macroeconomic and firm-specific variables, and thus examine whether this measured
volatility is a proxy for idiosyncratic risk or uncertainty. We find that IVOL can be explained by
aggregate variables known to explain stock market volatility, and the negative relation between
IVOL and stock returns mainly comes from aggregate variables. Teasing out the common IVOL
part, the residual IVOL is positively priced, as suggested by incomplete market hypotheses and
ambiguity aversion theory.
1
2. IN THE FACE OF AMBIGUITY: INVESTORS’ REACTIONS TO NEWS
2.1 Introduction
Investors are surrounded by a variety of information nowadays, from economy-wide news to
corporate earnings reports. They make use of all types of information available to estimate key
variables of their interest. But not always do they feel certain as to how to interpret information
precisely, especially when the information itself is ambiguous. Can we quantify the degree of
ambiguity in the news? If so, more importantly, how would investors process news with ambiguous
value?
As Epstein and Schneider (2008) point out in their model, when the information has a par-
ticular type of uncertainty, Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity, ambiguity-averse agents treat bad
news as more relevant and precise than good news. Therefore they react to the information in an
asymmetric way - they respond more strongly to bad news than good news. Besides, investors
respond to firm-specific information as well as macroeconomic information so that asset prices
reflect idiosyncratic risks. A key obstacle to test this model is the measurement of ambiguity. Typ-
ical proxies are used at the macro level, such as VIX or variance risk premium. This paper uses
two proxies of firm-level ambiguity and tests the asymmetric effect documented in Epstein and
Schneider (2008).
The paper first lays out the theory of Epstein and Schneider (2008). At each period, an
ambiguity-averse agent observes an ambiguous and noisy signal. When the investor receives a
signal, she is concerned about the ambiguity of the signal over time. She cannot interpret the sig-
nal precisely and makes decisions under the worst case scenario. When the news is good, she will
regard it as less relevant with low precision, whereas bad news is viewed as more informative with
high accuracy. Thus the investor places more weight on bad news than good news. This setup of-
fers two hypotheses: (1) Investors react more to bad news than good news of the same magnitude,
producing an asymmetric response to the news, and (2) the magnitude of the asymmetric effect
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increases with the level of ambiguity.
To test these hypotheses, we hand collected all dividend and earnings-related news of S&P
500 firms between 2000 and 2015 from a global news database from Dow Jones Factiva. The first
ambiguity proxy measures the qualitative aspect of the news. Intuitively, soft information is harder
to interpret and process than hard information. Investors can easily analyze numbers in an earnings
report or annual report based on their experience or past data, whereas soft information such as
opinions or rumors about a firm is more subject to differential interpretation. Also, the language
used in the news also matters. If a piece of news uses too many vague or uncertain words such
as “maybe", “could be" or “possibly", the news content is less clear to investors and admits more
ambiguous interpretation. Thus, the second proxy of ambiguity measures the uncertain aspect of
the news. Results show these two proxies do not overlap with each other perfectly. Instead, they
capture different aspects of the source of the ambiguity.
The main finding in this paper is that in the two-day window around the news, stock returns
increase 13 bps to a unit of good news, but decrease 38.2 bps to a unit of bad news, producing an
asymmetric effect of 25.2 bps. This result is robust to controlling for other variables that could also
affect the stock return. The logical next question is whether the extent of the asymmetric effect
becomes larger when the news is more ambiguous. With the two proxies for firm-level ambiguity
included in regressions, the finding shows that investors give a higher weight on bad news than
good news when the ambiguity proxy is larger. In this case, the asymmetric effect ranges from
31.7 bps to 37.8 bps depending on different proxies used in the analysis. The paper also explores
difference sources of the news. Compared to press releases and conference transcripts provided
directly from the firm, other news such as commentaries or opinions of journalists needs more
judgment of the news quality. Results are robust in the subsample with the exclusion of press
releases and transcripts. Overall, the results are consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion
that investors are pessimistic and act cautiously when facing ambiguous information.
To rule out other forces that lead to the documented asymmetric response, we consider several
alternative explanations. The ambiguity proxies in the paper could be related to macro variables.
3
First, the firm level ambiguity can be a reflection of macro-level uncertainty. To measure the
economy-wide ambiguity, we follow Williams (2015) and use the change in VIX over the two-day
period immediately preceding the two-day news day window. However, controlling for the change
in VIX, investors still react more to bad news than good news as the information becomes more
ambiguous, suggesting that the observed asymmetry is not due to macro-level uncertainty. Second,
it is possible that market sentiment is the driving force behind the asymmetric response. Baker and
Wurgler (2006) construct the investor sentiment index and find that investors overreact in high
sentiment periods and underreact in low sentiment periods. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012)
find that investors react more (less) strongly to good news than bad news when market sentiment
is high (low). To consider this explanation, we control for the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment
measure and find that results are robust. The third alternative explanation is that the market reacts
more to bad news than good news when the market valuation is high, as suggested by Conrad,
Cornell, and Landsman (2002). With the measure of state risk controlled, results of this paper
remain robust. Fourth, ambiguity proxies used in the paper may reflect the economic uncertainty.
The main results are robust after controlling the economic policy uncertainty index in the empirical
settings.
It is also possible that if management on average delays the release of bad news once it is accu-
mulated and withheld up to a certain threshold, but privately leaks and quickly reveals good news,
then investors will react more to bad news disclosures than to good news ones as Kothari et al.
(2009) find. They hypothesize that when there is high information asymmetry between managers
and investors, managers are better able to withhold bad news. Moreover, when managers’ wealth
is more tied to the firm value, managers have more incentive to delay their wealth loss after the
bad news disclosure. With proxies of information asymmetry and manager ownership incentives
included, the remain results rarely change.
Another possible explanation is that a loss-averse investor becomes more (less) loss-averse if
the prior gain is negative (positive), and this state-dependent nature of preference may produce
an asymmetric response to good and bad news under certain market conditions consistent with
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the prospect theory. To check the robustness of the main result to this explanation, past returns
and a dummy variable indicating the sign of past stock performance are added to the empirical
models, and asymmetric responses are still quite significant both economically and statistically.
Last, the empirical results may be sensitive and related to short-sale constraints. Using proxies for
short-sale constraints, short interest and institutional ownership, we find the main empirical results
still stand firm and significant. In addition to ruling out possible explanations, the paper tests the
relation between return volatility and ambiguity measures. The result shows that return volatility is
positively associated with ambiguity in the news, which is consistent with the ambiguity aversion
theory and intuition.
This paper builds on the literature that links ambiguity in the economy and asset prices. The
simple model follows Epstein and Schneider (2008), Kim (2015), and Zhou (2015), who inves-
tigate how ambiguity-averse investors process ambiguous information. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) argue that ambiguity-averse decision makers will make decisions when their utilities are
maximized in the worst case scenario, i.e., max-min expected utility. Hansen and Sargent (2001)
and related work use robust control theory to explore ambiguity aversion. Jeong, Kim, and Park
(2015) find that ambiguity aversion is vital in explaining the market equity premium using a
multiple-priors continuous-time model. With regard to the literature on ambiguous information,
Leippold, Trojani, and Vanini (2008) study asset prices under learning and ambiguous information
about the expected dividend growth, and their model is successful in matching the equity premium,
the interest rate, and the excess volatility. Illeditsch (2011) focuses on ambiguous signal precision
and its impact on optimal portfolios and equilibrium asset prices. Kim (2015) studies the impact
of ambiguous information regarding future interest rates on bond prices. The closest studies to this
paper are Williams (2015) and Zhou (2015). Williams (2015) uses VIX as a proxy for ambiguity
to test individual stock asymmetric responses to earning news. Zhou (2015) constructs a variance
risk premium series as a measure of ambiguity to test aggregate stock market reaction. In these two
papers, ambiguity proxy is macro-uncertainty related, and when the economy is in the uncertainty
state, people will find it hard to interpret information. An integral and novel part of this research
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is the construction of proxies for information ambiguity at the firm level. By doing so, this paper
contributes to the literature that focuses on testing its effect on individual stocks and providing
empirical evidence consistent with the theory.
This paper is also related to the studies on textual analysis in finance and accounting; see
Loughran and McDonald (2016) for a survey. Loughran and McDonald (2011) create six different
word lists (positive, negative, uncertainty, litigious, strong modal and weak modal) by exploring
words in a broad cross-section of 10-Ks. Many papers use these lists to measure the tone of
newspaper articles, and others use uncertain word lists to measure the vagueness in the disclosure.
Dzielínski et al.(2016) examine the use of vague words in earnings conference calls. Du (2015)
measures the usage of ambiguous words in the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of
annual and quarterly reports. von Beschwitz, Chuprinin, and Massa (2017) study how qualitative
news can affect short sellers’ trading by measuring the proportion of numbers used across all media
articles. One contribution of this paper in this regard is that it attempts to quantify both uncertain
and qualitative aspects of news, and applies this to ambiguity-based models. Given the rarity of
the measures of firm-specific ambiguity, this paper can shed light on how ambiguity plays a role in
firm decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the model. Section 2.3
describes the data and proposes information ambiguity measures. Section 2.4 presents empirical
results and robustness tests. The paper concludes in Section 2.5.
2.2 Theoretical Motivation and Research Design
This section develops a simple asset pricing model based on Epstein and Schneider (2008) to
motivate the empirical study that follows. Suppose that Ω is a state space and one element st ∈ Ω
prevails every period. The representative investor is assumed to be ambiguity-averse, and she has
information of the history st ≡ {s0, . . . st} at each time t. Given a history st, her preference over
consumption c is presented by a utility function Ut recursively
Ut(c; s
t) = max
c
min
pt∈Pt(st)
Ept [u(ct) + βUt+1(c; s
t, st+1)], (2.1)
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where u(·), ct and β are the notations for a concave utility function, consumption at time t, and
the time discount factor, respectively. As in Epstein and Schneider (2008), Pt(st) represents con-
ditional beliefs about the next observation st+1. When the investor is ambiguity-averse and faces a
range of probability measures, she will choose the one that leads to the lowest expected utility.
2.2.1 Setup
To begin with, based on the setting of infinite horizon in Epstein and Schneider (2008), the
dividends of some assets is specified as
dt+1 = κd+ (1− κ)dt + ut+1, (2.2)
which is revealed at time t+ 1. d is the mean dividend, κ ∈ (0, 1) and ut+1 is a normal, mean-zero
shock.
At time t, the agent observes an ambiguous and noisy signal st on next period’s shock (ut+1):
st = ut+1 + 
s
t + ηt−1νt. (2.3)
st ∼ N(0, σ2s) is a normal, mean-zero shock. The news is ambiguous to the investor as she only
knows that the variance st is within the interval [σ
2
s , σ
2
s ]. As an extension to Epstein and Schneider
(2008), ηt−1νt is included in the signal process. Kim (2015) suggests that ηt−1νt is a time-varying,
but unambiguous noise to create time-varying ambiguity. Here νt ∼ N(0, 1) and ηt is a Markov
process. Intuitively, when the investor receives a signal, she is concerned about the existence of
the signal over time. Thus she cannot interpret the signal precisely.
Based on the signal received, the investor updates expectation about the dividend shock in the
Bayesian fashion
E(ut+1|st) = E(ut+1) + Cov(ut+1, st)
V ar(st)
(st − E(st))
=
σ2u
σ2u + σ
2
s + η
2
t−1
st.
(2.4)
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Denote γt ≡ σ2uσ2u+σ2s+η2t−1 and γt ≡
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
s+η
2
t−1
. Under ambiguity, γt is larger than γt. γt and γt
provide the upper and lower bounds on information content, respectively. The information will be
more ambiguous as γt − γt increases.
2.2.2 Asset Prices
In this subsection, we assume a risk-neutral yet ambiguity-averse investor in the model to focus
on the effect of ambiguity. In addition, a discount factor β is defined as 1
1+r
with r being a risk-free
rate.
2.2.2.1 Unambiguous News Benchmark
When news is unambiguous, the investor knows the true variance and does not need to choose
its distribution. That is, σ2s = σ
2
s = σ
2
s under this scenario. It is straightforward to derive the price
after the arrival of the news:
qt =
d
r
+
1− κ
r + κ
(dt − d) + 1
r + κ
γtst. (2.5)
From Equation 2.5, the investor reacts the same magnitude to both good news and bad news,
producing the symmetrical effect.
2.2.2.2 Ambiguity News
Now assume an ambiguous signal arrives. The price of the asset after the arrival of the signal
is computed as
qt = min
(σ2s,t,σ
2
s,t+1)∈[σ2s ,σ2s ]2
βEt[qt+1 + dt+1]
=

d
r
+ 1−κ
r+κ
(dt − d) + 1r+κγtst − (γt − γt) σur√2piγt , if st ≥ 0
d
r
+ 1−κ
r+κ
(dt − d) + 1r+κγtst − (γt − γt) σur√2piγt , otherwise
(2.6)
Consistent with Epstein and Schneider (2008), the first two terms reflect the present value of div-
idends. The third term captures the asymmetric response to ambiguous information. The fourth
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term is the present value of ambiguity premium for future ambiguous news. Compared the third
term across different news types, the stock price decreases for a negative piece of news more than
the stock price increases for a positive piece of news with the same magnitude, producing the
asymmetric effect given γt > γt. Intuitively, the ambiguity-averse investor makes decisions under
the worst case scenario. So when new is good, she will regard it as less relevant with low precision
whereas the bad news is viewed as more informative with high precision. Thus the investor places
more weight on bad news than good news. Moreover, as σ2s − σ2s increases, the investor feels more
ambiguous about the signal, which leads to an increase in γt − γt. With the greater ambiguity, the
asymmetric effect also increases.
2.2.3 Hypotheses and Research Design
Two hypotheses can be directly derived from the model above.
Hypothesis 1: When a piece of news about the dividend shock arrives, investors react more
strongly to bad news than good news of the same magnitude. Thus the response to the news is
asymmetric.
Hypothesis 2: The asymmetric effect is driven by the variation of ambiguity in the information.
The magnitude of the asymmetric effect enlarges with the greater ambiguity.
To test Hypothesis 1, the regression to be estimated is 1
Retit = β0 + β1Goodnewsit + β2Badnewsit + Controlsit + δi + γt + it. (2.7)
This specification allows for differential responses to good and bad news. Goodnews (Badnews)
is equal to the new tone measure when the measure > (<) 0 and 0 otherwise, which will be
explained in details in next section. β1 measures the response to good news and β2 represents the
response to bad news. Based on Hypothesis 1, the magnitude of β1 is expected to be smaller than
β2.
1This methodology follows Conrad (2002). Williams (2015) also uses the same specification.
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The following specification is used to test the second hypothesis,
Retit = β0 + β1Goodnewsit + β2Badnewsit + β3Ambiguityit
+ β4Goodnewsit ∗ Ambiguityit + β5Badnewsit ∗ Ambiguityit
+ Controlsit + δi + γt + it.
(2.8)
Ambiguity is the proxy for firm-level ambiguity introduced in details later. Interaction terms
between news tone and ambiguity proxies are included in this specification. The incremental sign
on interaction terms indicates whether investors respond more following an increase in ambiguity.
Based on Hypothesis 2, the sign on β4 is expected to be negative than or equal to 0 whereas β5 is
expected to be greater than 0. The other interest in (2.8) is the overall effect. The magnitude of
β1 + β4 is expected to be less than that of β2 + β5, and the difference in the magnitude of total
coefficients will be tested.
2.3 Data
This section introduces data used in the paper. From the theory presented in the previous
section, ambiguity aversion can be tested based on whether the news is good or bad. Also, the
theory implies that ambiguity contained in the news is associated with the uncertain degrees of
accuracy when news about a firm is available. Based on these observations, a few empirical proxies
for ambiguity are constructed.
2.3.1 News Data
The empirical analysis in the paper uses public news from Factiva. Factiva is a subsidiary of
Dow Jones & Company and provides access to more than 32,000 news sources worldwide. To
focus on news directly linked to firm fundamental, all dividend- and earnings-related news of S&P
500 companies from 2000 to 2015 are manually collected. According to Factiva2, dividends news
includes dividend announcements, dividend increases or reduction, and any other dividend-related
news. Earnings news contains earnings announcements, preliminary and unaudited results when
2https://www.dowjones.com/products/factiva/
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specific figures are given, earnings restatements and profitability indicator ratios, earnings surprise
and reported sales figures. There is also another type of news related to earnings news, i.e., earnings
projections. It covers earnings or revenue projections, as well as profit warnings announced by a
public company in advance of its earnings announcements 3.
This paper uses articles in English categorized under “Dow Jones News Wire" for each S&P
500 firm4. Each article downloaded from Factiva contains a number of data elements. It includes
headline and content of the news, the number of words in the news, the publication date and
time, the name of the source (e.g., Dow Jones Institutional News) and the author of the news (if
applicable). An example of articles collected is given in the Appendix. Some filters are imposed to
eliminate irrelevant stories. Each article has to occur while the firm is a constituent of the S&P 500
index. In addition, each story should contain at least 20 words, and it mentions the firm’s official
name at least once within the headline and the leading paragraph which is the first two paragraphs
of an article, and the firm’s common name at least twice within the full article. Suggested by
Shleifer (1986), stock price increases after a firm is included in the S&P index. Therefore, all
articles in the first week after the inclusion in the index are excluded. The final sample consists of
59,076 unique qualifying news stories for 718 firms5.
2.3.2 Good News versus Bad News Using News Tone
Each article in the sample is classified as good, bad, or neutral. Following Tetlock et al. (2008),
the primary measure for news tone is defined as
adjusted_net_tone =
No. of positive words−No. of negative words
No. of positive words+No. of negative words
. (2.9)
3To be included in the sample, an article should have a subject code of C1512, C151 or C152 which correspond
to dividends, earnings and earnings projections respectively based on Factiva Intelligent Indexing Subject Code. An
article also has to have "dividend(s)" or "earning(s)" in its headline or leading paragraph. An article can contain
information on both dividends and earnings based on this criteria.
4See Tetlock et al. (2008) for detailed methods of finding firms’ name used in the media.
5Unreported results show that 19.8% of articles in the final sample contains information about dividends, 86.2% of
articles are earnings-related, and 46.8% of articles talk about earnings projections.
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Positive and negative words are based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) Dictionary6. This
dictionary is created based on a large sample of 10-Ks during 1994 to 2008, containing six different
word lists (Positive, Negative, Uncertainty, Litigious, Strong Modal and Weak Modal). According
to Loughran and McDonald (2011), this dictionary has the most interpretation of a word in financial
communication compared with standard dictionaries. To be specific, 353 words in the dictionary
are identified as positive words, and there exist 2,337 negative words, suggesting that expressions
may be more sophisticated in describing negative situations 7.
When adjusted_net_tone of each article is larger (smaller) than 0, the news is classified as
positive (negative) news. By construction, an article is neutral when adjusted_net_tone is 0. As
a robustness check, the other measure net_tone of an article is constructed as
net_tone =
No. of positive words−No. of negative words
No. of total words
. (2.10)
2.3.3 Ambiguity Proxies
Tangible (hard) information is easier to interpret rather than intangible (soft) information. The
intuition is line with Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Beschwitz, Chuprinin, and Massa (2017)
that quantitative news is less subjective to differential interpretation. Investors can learn from his-
torical data and experience to help them understand the quantitative news. On the other hand, soft
information such as opinions, commentaries, and rumors about a firm can be interpreted differently
by optimists and pessimists. As a measure of the qualitative (soft) aspects of the news, the first
proxy is constructed as
AMBnumseq = 1− Numbers
No. of total words
. (2.11)
6https://www3.nd.edu/ mcdonald/Word_Lists.html
7See Appendix Table A.13 for a subset of words in each category.
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Numbers in the measure is based on numeric sequences, which is a sequence of symbol 0-9
bordered by any non-alphanumeric symbol 8. An additional measure is constructed as
AMBnumsym = 1− Number Symbols
No. of total symbols
, (2.12)
whereNumber Symbols is the number of numeric symbols in an article. In the empirical analysis,
AMBnumseq is used as the primary measure, and AMBnumsym is used for robustness check9
In addition to the qualitative aspect, the language used in the news also matters in that am-
biguous and vague content in the news can affect the precision of the information. If a piece of
news includes many vague or uncertain words such as “maybe", “could be" or “possibly", the news
content is less clear to investors and admits more ambiguous interpretation. Du (2015) measures
ambiguity ratio of soft information as the percentage of uncertainty and weak modal words in the
annual and quarterly reports. Dzielin´ski, Wagner, and Zeckhauser (2016) proxy manager vague-
ness on the conference call by the use of uncertain words. Motivated by these papers, the second
measure in the public news is defined as follows.
AMBnetunc =
No. of uncertain words−No. of certain words
No. of total words
. (2.13)
Uncertain words are defined as Loughran and McDonald (2011), and they focus on the general
notion of imprecision. Certain words are “strong modal" words in Loughran and McDonald (2011).
“Strong modal" words are created with an emphasis on the level of confidence. In total, there are
297 uncertain words, and the list of “strong modal" contains 19 words. Examples of each category
are given below.
Uncertain words: risk, approximately, believe, roughly, might, etc.
Strong modal words: will, best, highest, must, clearly, etc.
Prior research in textual analysis use the Harvard word lists produced by General Inquirer
8For example: $10,000, 6.6% or 200.
9An illustrative example: I have 10 apples. AMBnumseq = 1− 14 , AMBnumsym = 1− 213 .
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(GI)10. This dictionary has 175 words indicating "a feeling of sureness, certainty and firmness",
and 132 words "denoting feelings of uncertainty, doubt and vagueness". As a robustness check,
lists of uncertain words and certain words are constructed from the overlap words in Loughran
and McDonald (2011) list and the GI category. Words lists of the combination of Loughran and
McDonald (2011) list and the GI category are also used to measure the ambiguity. In the main
analyses, lists in Loughran and McDonald (2011) are used to constructed ambiguity proxies, and
lists from the alternative dictionaries are tested as robustness checks.
Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), the paper accounts for simple negation for positive,
negative, uncertain and certain words11. Loughran and Mcdonald (2016) suggest identifying the
proportions of the most frequently used words for research using words classifications given that
certain words can potentially have a larger impact according to Zipf’s law. Figure A.1 and Figure
A.2 show the plots the frequency of top 25 frequently occurring positive, negative, uncertain, and
certain words. These popular words seem to alleviate the concern that misclassification drives the
results. For uncertain words used in the news, the top 3 words are "could", "may" and "nearly".
These words account for 27% of the total uncertain words count.
2.3.4 Other Variables
The key dependent variable is the two-day (t, t + 1) cumulative abnormal return adjusted for
a six-factor model - Fama and French (2015) five factors and momentum factor over news day
t. For each firm in the sample, stock data is from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database and financial accounting data from Compustat. Firm size (Size) is defined as a firm’s
market equity value. Illiquidity (Illiquidity) is measured as in Amihud (2002). In addition, other
variables include the average level of VIX over the week prior to the news (V IX_lag) and return
over the prior month (Return_lag).
Specification (2.7) and specification (2.8) will be estimated using daily observations for each
firm. Given multiple news occurrences at the same day, all news related variables within each
10http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/ inquirer/
11Simple negation is taken to be observations of one of six words (no, not, none, neither, never, nobody) occurring
within three words preceding a word.
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day are averaged by using news article in the trading window from 9:35 am to 15:55 pm for each
firm. For news article occurring outside the trading window, they are classified as news of the next
trading window.
To measure daily news tone of firm i at certain day t (adjusted_net_toneit), all news tones at
that day are averaged. Overall, key independent variables at each day are defined as
Goodnewsit(Badnewsit) =

adjusted_net_toneit, if adjusted_net_toneit > (<) 0
0, otherwise
(2.14)
Firm (Industry) effects and year effects are included in the regression. To allow observations
in the same firm at the same week to be correlated, standard errors are clustered at firm-week
level. All firm-level variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% cutoffs to eliminate outliers. News
tone measures and ambiguity measures are log transformed when included in the regressions12
Except for stock returns, all variables are normalized. Stock returns are reported in percentage.
The definitions of variables are given below.
2.3.5 Summary Statistics
The sample consists of 36,968 daily observations. Panel A in Table A.2 reports summary
statistics at the news level. The sample contains more bad news than good news. The mean
(median) of news tone is -8.03% (0.000%). Around 8% of the words are numbers, and 0.44% of
the words are uncertain words. On average, there are 2 articles for a firm at each day. Panel C
of Table A.2 reports summary statistics across good news and bad news. To alleviate the concern
that good news capture relative good news and bad news measures extreme bad ones, in the main
analysis news tone measures for each news type are normalized by its group standard deviation
respectively. As it shows in Table A.2, bad news and good news differ in the ambiguity proxies.
Though the magnitudes of differences are not large, it still indicates that bad news tends to be more
ambiguous. Table A.3 reports the correlation among news variables. The news tone is negatively
12Since some variables values are negative, a formula sign(X) ∗ log(1 + |x|) is used for log tranformation.
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correlated with each of the information ambiguity measures weakly . AMBnumseq is associated
with AMBnetunc with a correlation of 10.31%, suggesting that they measure different aspects of
news with some commonality.
2.4 Main Findings
2.4.1 The Asymmetric Response to News
In Section 2.2, Hypothesis 1 implies the existence of the asymmetric effect. To verify if this
effect prevails, Table A.4 presents the results from specification (2.7). Column (1) shows that one
standard deviation more (log) bad news lowers the stock cumulative abnormal return by 38.2 bps
whereas one standard deviation more (log) good news increases the return by 13 bps; both coeffi-
cients are significantly different from zero. In addition, from the test of asymmetry, the difference
of 25.2 bps between the two is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, suggesting an
asymmetry of the price reaction to the news. After adding other control variables, column (2)
shows that the asymmetric effect is robust, and the extent of the effect is significantly different
from zero. When industry fixed effects is included in the specification, the results are robust as
shown in column (3) and column (4).
Given the finding that bad news is likely to be more ambiguous news as shown in Table A.2, it
is possible that the asymmetric effect is driven by the ambiguity in the news in lieu of the news tone
being bad. This correlation may result from firms who have an incentive to create ambiguity in case
of bad news to cloud investors’ perception. It is subtle, but if investors are aware of this tendency,
investors simply react to bad news more to cope with added uncertainty. Investors still dislike
ambiguity, but in this case, they have suspicions regarding the quality of information because it is
likely to be worse than reported. In an attempt to identify different channels of ambiguity, several
robustness checks are performed. Table A.5 reports the regression results adding the ambiguity
proxies. Column (1) includes the qualitative measure (AMBnumseq), and the magnitude of the
asymmetric effect is 26.4 bps, which is similar to that in Table A.4. Column (2) controls for
another uncertainty measure (AMBnetunc), and the result is robust.
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Regarding the direct effect of ambiguity or uncertainty, one interesting finding in this table
is that one unit of (log) AMBnumseq decreases return by 12.3 bps whereas AMBnetunc increases
return by 4.7 bps. Different responses to ambiguity proxies may be due to various aspects these
proxies measure. To test this conjecture, Column (3) in Table A.5 presents the results controlling
for both AMBnumseq and AMBnetunc. First, the asymmetric effect of 27.4 bps is significantly
different from zero. Second, similar to Column (1) and Column (2), the coefficient onAMBnumseq
is -0.129 and significant at 1% level whereas the coefficient on AMBnetunc is 0.058 and significant
at 1% level. Unreported results show that the two coefficients are significantly different from each
other at 1% level. As can be seen from Table A.3 that the correlation between AMBnumseq and
AMBnetunc is 10.31%, together these findings suggest the two measures capture different sources
of ambiguity in the news. As a robustness test, another measure of news tone net_tone is used,
and the results are robust as seen in Appendix A.14. Overall findings in Table A.4 and Table A.5
are consistent with Hypothesis 1, implying the existence of the asymmetric effect.
Does the extent of the asymmetric effect vary when the news is harder to interpret? Based on
Hypothesis 2, ambiguity-averse investors would be more concerned about the information with
greater ambiguity than the smaller ones. Therefore, the variation of ambiguity will drive the vari-
ation of the magnitude of the asymmetric effect. Table A.6 presents the results when interaction
terms are included. Column (1) and column (3) report coefficients when firm fixed effects and
year fixed effects are included, whereas column (2) and column (4) show results with industry
fixed effect and year fixed effect. The total coefficients on good news are smaller than those on
bad news overall. When the news contains more qualitative information, investors react 37.8 bps
more to bad news than good news. As the news uses more uncertain words, the stock return in-
creases by 11.7 bps to good news and decreases 43.4 bps to bad news. The asymmetric effects
are statistically significant in both specifications. In addition, the coefficients on the interaction
terms are also in line with the predictions. With the greater ambiguity in the news, investors place
less weight on good news and treat it less precisely. On the other hand, the bad news is weighed
more heavily. That is, the coefficient on Goodnews ∗ Ambiguity is less than or equal to 0, and
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the coefficient on Badnews ∗ Ambiguity is greater than 0. Across all columns, the coefficients
on Badnews ∗ Ambiguity are positive and statistically significantly different from zero, suggest-
ing that investors are more concerned with bad and more ambiguous news. However, none of the
coefficients on Goodnews ∗ Ambiguity are significant at 10% level. Regarding the sign, they are
negative in all columns. Appendix Table A.15 reports coefficients when an alternative qualitative
proxy, AMBnumsym is included. Robust to the alternative qualitative measure, the variation in am-
biguity measures drives the variation in the asymmetric effect. As an additional robustness check,
the dependent variable in the specification is replaced with three-day (t − 1, t + 1) cumulative
abnormal return adjusted for Fama and French five-and-momentum-factor model over news day
t and results are reported in appendix Table A.16. The overall asymmetric effect is bigger in a
three-day window. Investors react 42.3 bps more to bad news when AMBnumseq is used, and the
asymmetric effect is 34.9 bps after controlling for AMBnetunc.
It is possible that the ambiguity proxy AMBnetunc, and thus the main results are sensitive
to how uncertain words and certain words are defined. To consider this possibility, we use three
different word lists to construct the measureAMBnetunc, and Table A.7 reports investors responses
to news following an increase in the usage of uncertain words. In column (1) and column (2),
uncertain words and certain words are defined by the overlap of Loughran and McDonald (2011)
list and the GI dictionary. It is worth noting that words related to risk ("risk","risks") are among
the top 25 most frequently occurring uncertain and certain words as shown in A.2. Also "nearly",
"approximately" and "roughly" are commonly used. One may question that these words are more
related to risk or imprecision, rather than uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, column (3) and
column (4) report results by using a modified list of the overlap dictionary excluding those words
and their inflections. Column (5) and column (6) show the regression coefficients when uncertain
words and certain words are defined by the combination of Loughran and McDonald (2011) list
and the GI dictionary. Robust to different dictionaries or different fixed effects used, when more
uncertain words are used in the news, investors react more strongly to bad news than good news.
Overall, the findings in Table A.6 and A.7 suggest that investors place more weights on bad news
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as news is more ambiguous, which is consistent with Hypotheses 2.
2.4.2 Who Writes the News
Different types of news are covered in Factiva. It contains press releases and written repro-
duction of what was said orally at a press conference or on broadcast media. Other examples of
news are in-depth analyses by the writer, columns, commentaries or opinions of the journalists,
and insights into companies, etc. Compared with press releases and transcripts which are directly
provided by firms, news from other sources needs more judgment from investors for its quality.
If a piece of news comes from an unfamiliar media, or just reflects the opinion or conjecture of
the news writer, it is difficult for investors fully process information since the reliability of the
source is questionable to them. Hence, the main findings documented in the previous subsection
are expected to be robust for news indirectly provided by the firm.
To shed light on how investors react to news from sources other than firms, we exclude press
releases and transcripts from the sample13. Table A.8 reports the results in the subsample, and
they are robust. When the news contains more soft information than hard information, stock return
decreases 53.1 bps for bad news whereas it increases only 19.4 bps for good news, implying the
existence of the asymmetric effect. The result is similar when more uncertain words are used,
though the magnitude of the effect is smaller, and the result is robust when industry fixed effects is
included. With the greater ambiguity in non-press release/transcripts type of news, investors act as
more cautiously and conservatively. Although it is relatively coarse only to exclude press releases
and transcripts, Table A.8 provides evidence that the main findings documented come from the
news indirectly provided by the firm.
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
This section conducts robustness tests and investigates multiple alternative explanations studied
by Williams (2015) and other related studies.
13Press Release has a subject code "npress" and a transcript has subject code "ntra" based on Factiva Intelligent
Indexing Subject Code.
19
2.4.3.1 Macro or Micro
Williams (2015) uses the change in VIX over the two-day period immediately preceding the
three-day news day window as a proxy for macro-level uncertain shocks. The paper finds more
response to bad news than good news when the VIX increases prior to the news. Macro-level
uncertainty can affect not only the decision process of investors but also the signal generation
process. It is likely that news is more ambiguous when news writers are influenced by macro-level
uncertainty. Therefore, the ambiguity in the news is merely a reflection of macro-level uncertainty.
To rule out this explanation, two-day change in VIX (∆V IX) is included in the regression as
reported in column (1) of Table A.9 Panel A and column (1) of Table A.10 Panel A. To control
for the potential effect of the announcement of dividend increases, we also include a dummy for
dividend change. As similar in Table A.6, not only are the coefficients on Badnews ∗ Ambiguity
interaction term significantly positive for any of the proxies used, but also the overall effects of
good news are smaller than bad news. When the change in VIX is controlled, the asymmetric
effect is 39.9 bps when AMBnumseq is included and it is 32.2 bps when AMBnetunc is used to
measure ambiguity. In sum, it is unlikely that macro-level uncertainty is the driving force behind
the results.
It is possible that investors respond asymmetrically due to investor sentiment. Baker and Wur-
gler (2006) construct the investor sentiment index and find that investors overreact in high senti-
ment periods and underreact in low sentiment periods. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) docu-
ment that investors react more (less) strongly to good news than bad news when market sentiment
is high (low). To consider this explanation, we include the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment
index, and it is interacted with both Goodnews and Badnews. Table A.9 Panel A column (2) and
Table A.10 Panel A column (2) report the result from inclusion of ambiguity proxies and interac-
tion terms in the regression. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 2. The ambiguity-induced
asymmetry ranges from 28.5 bps to 36.8 bps which are different from zero at 1% significance level.
Therefore, the results are robust to the inclusion of investor sentiment.
The third alternative explanation is that the market reacts more to bad news than good news
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when the market valuation is high, as suggested by Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002). When
the market valuation is high, i.e., good times, bad news is unexpected and good news is expected,
producing a larger effect on bad news and a smaller effect on good ones. Table A.9 Panel A column
(3) and Table A.10 Panel A column (3) show the results from inclusion of market valuation proxy.
Following Conrad et al. (2002), the relative price-to-earnings ratio (DCAPE) is constructed. It is
the cyclically-adjusted price-to-earnings ratio from Robert Shiller’s website subtract its previous
12-month average. Consistent with the predictions, the ambiguity-induced asymmetry ranges from
27.2 bps to 33.8 bps; both are significant at 1% level. The results indicate that the documented
asymmetry effect is robust to the inclusion of the market condition variable.
Fourth, ambiguity in the news may reflect the overall economic uncertainty. Thus the economic
policy uncertainty index (EPUI) constructed by Baker et al. (2016) is included in the regression.
As shown in Table A.9 Panel A column (4) and Table A.10 Panel A column (4), the economic
uncertainty cannot be the explanation of observed asymmetric response. Instead, the main results
are still robust to controlling for this measure.
2.4.3.2 Bad News Withholding
Kothari et al. (2009) find that investors react more to bad news disclosures than to good news
ones, suggesting management on average delays the release of bad news once it is accumulated
and withheld up to a certain threshold, but privately leaks and quickly reveals good news. If this
explanation is the main driving force of the results in Table A.6, then there should be an asymmetry
between the magnitude of good news versus bad news. However, as shown in Table A.2 Panel C,
the average magnitude of good new is 0.546 but the average bad news tone measure is 0.537, and
their difference is statistically significant.
To rule out this possibility formally, Table A.9 Panel B and Table A.10 Panel B report the result
by including proxies of information asymmetry and manager ownership incentives. As Kothari et
al. (2009) argue, when there is high information asymmetry between managers and investors, man-
agers are better able to withhold bad news. Moreover, when managers’ wealth is more tied to the
firm value, managers have more incentive to delay their wealth loss after the bad news disclosure.
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Following Kothari et al. (2009), the manager ownership proxy is constructed as the fraction of
total shares outstanding held by managers. As for information asymmetry proxies, four variables
are considered: (1) market-to-book ratio, (2) annual stock volatility, (3) a dummy for high-tech
industries, and (4) a dummy for regulated industries (other than financial institutions). Growth
firms may have more information asymmetry than value firms. For firms with high return volatility
and high-tech firms, they face more uncertainty, and thus increases information asymmetry. How-
ever, firms in regulated industries must timely disclose information to regulatory bodies, therefore
reducing information asymmetry. As seen in Table A.9 Panel B and Table A.10 Panel B, the main
results are robust to the inclusion of these variables. Therefore, the asymmetric reaction is more
consistent with the ambiguity theory than with the withholding bad news hypothesis.
2.4.3.3 Additional Robustness Checks
Another economic mechanism related to the study comes from psychology and behavioral
finance literature. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler and Johnson (1990), and
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), investors’ risk preferences depend on changes in financial
wealth and feature aversions to loss over financial wealth. Thus, risk aversion can vary over good
and bad states of an economy according to this theory. Testable implications of this theory are
that a loss-averse investor becomes more (less) loss-averse if the prior gain is negative (positive),
and this state-dependent nature of preference may produce an asymmetric response to good and
bad news under certain market conditions. To check the robustness of the main result to this
explanation, past returns and a dummy variable indicating the sign of past stock performance are
added to the empirical models, and Table A.9 Panel C column (1) and column (2), and Table A.10
Panel C column (1) and column (2) report the results. Again, asymmetric responses are still quite
significant both economically and statistically.
Lastly, the empirical results may be sensitive and related to short-sale constraints. According
to Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), stocks with high forecast dispersions tend to earn lower
returns because reactions by pessimistic investors are restricted due to the existence of a short-sale
constraint. This finding works against our finding in that bad news will have a less price reaction
22
than it should be if short-sale constraints are binding. As proxies for short-sale constraints, short
interest and institutional ownership are included in the empirical settings. The main empirical
results shown in Table A.9 and A.10 still stand firm and significant.
Finally, Table A.11 reports the results controlling for all alternative explanations discussed
above and their interactions withGoodnews andBadnews. Though coefficients on the interaction
termBadnews∗Ambiguity is insignificant whenAMBnetunc is used, the documented asymmetric
response is robust. To summarize, the evidence in Table A.9, A.10 and A.11 is consistent with the
Hypothesis 2 that investors weight bad news more when the new is more ambiguous.
Before concluding the paper, Table A.12 displays relations between yearly return volatility on
news day and the ambiguity measures used in this paper. The result shows that return volatility
is positively affected by ambiguity in firm-specific news, again consistent with the theory and
intuition. Return volatility is known to be highly persistent, and controlling for the lagged return
volatility does not change the result.
In sum, results are robust to these alternative explanations. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and
2, investors not only react more to bad news than good news but also even more strongly when
news becomes more ambiguous.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines how investors respond to firm-specific news regarding dividends and earn-
ings when they receive ambiguous news and cannot interpret it precisely. Given the rarity of mea-
sures of firm-specific ambiguity, the paper uses two proxies to quantify qualitative and uncertain
aspects of news. The central finding is that stock returns response more strongly to bad news than
good news. Furthermore, the magnitude of the asymmetric effect enlarges when news becomes
more ambiguous as measured by ambiguity proxies. The documented asymmetric effect also pre-
vails in the subsample excluding press releases and transcripts. In robustness checks, alternative
explanations are investigated, and main results are robust.
In sum, the paper contributes to the literature by providing ambiguity proxies at the firm level,
which are useful to future research in finance and accounting. Moreover, it shows empirical ev-
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idence consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion, providing insights into how investors
process information with uncertain value.
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3. AMBIGUITY, MACRO FACTORS, AND STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY
3.1 Introduction
Is idiosyncratic return volatility associated with ambiguity or risk? If so, does it proxy for
idiosyncratic risk or uncertainty? Idiosyncratic return volatility has been extensively discussed in
the literature, yet the topic still provides challenging questions to many researchers and practi-
tioners. Lintner (1965) points out that idiosyncratic volatility has a positive coefficient in cross-
sectional regressions. Some theories imply a compensation for bearing idiosyncratic risk. For
instance, Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2002) suggest that firms with larger
firm-specific volatilities require higher returns because of an incomplete market and resultant
under-diversification. Lehmann (1990) finds a positive and statistically significant coefficient on
idiosyncratic volatility using individual securities, and Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) also report a
positive link between average idiosyncratic volatility and the market return. Epstein and Schneider
(2008) show that agents can demand a positive premium for holding stocks with high idiosyn-
cratic volatility due to ambiguity or uncertainty aversion. Fu (2009) uses a parametric stochastic
volatility model to find that expected idiosyncratic volatilities are positively related to expected re-
turns. However, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006, 2009) (AHXZ hereafter) and many related
papers find that monthly stock returns are negatively associated with the one-month lagged id-
iosyncratic volatilities, and the strong statistical significance of this negative relation has presented
an important asset pricing puzzle (IVOL puzzle).
AHXZ (2006)’s results have attracted much attention since then. A large number of papers
have been trying to solve the IVOL puzzle, which we review the literature in the next section.
However, as mentioned early, a key question to be answered is whether or not the IVOL in AHXZ
(2006) represents idiosyncratic risk and uncertainty of firms in that it is uncorrelated with aggregate
variables. Panel (A) in Figure B.1 displays an empirical distribution of the ratio of IVOL to return
volatility. According to the figure, AHXZ (2006)’s IVOL accounts for over 88% of return volatility
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on average, suggesting that the IVOL measure does not differ much from the total variations in
return. Although it is possible that most of return volatility results from idiosyncratic fluctuations,
this stylized fact naturally leads to a question whether those variables known to explain or predict
return volatility could also explain IVOL.
In a pioneering study by Schwert (1989) and many studies that follow, aggregate variables
including the volatilities of macroeconomic variables, NBER recession indicator, term spread and
credit spread can explain or predict stock returns and return volatilities. In addition, the literature
finds that aggregate cash-flow-to-price ratio, dividend-to-price ratio (dividend yield), leverage and
trading volume serve as other determinants of return volatility. Further, aggregate volatility can
affect stock return through uncertainty channels via the analyst forecast dispersion, according to
Schwert (1989), Epstein and Schneider (2008), Kim, Lee, Park, and Yeo (2009), and Jeong, Kim,
and Park (2015) etc.1 By projecting IVOL of individual firms onto these aggregate variables known
to explain or predict return volatility, we compute the empirical distribution of adjusted R2 values
to check if variations in IVOL are indeed associated with macroeconomic variables. Panel (B) of
Figure B.1 shows that over 30% of IVOL variations come from those of macroeconomic variables
on average, and adjusted R2 are greater than 0 in more than 80% of cases, despite the fact that
IVOL controls for the key asset pricing factors.2
Motivated by this, we disentangle IVOL into systematic and idiosyncratic fluctuations, and
investigate their respective roles in accounting for the cross section of stock prices. In addition, we
attempt to further dissect contributions from risk and uncertainty in determining the conditional
means and volatilities of stock returns.
To produce concrete hypotheses, we write down an economic model and relate return volatility
to the cross section of stock returns. In the setup, we incorporate ambiguity aversion into an asset
pricing model with recursive preferences popularized by Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Bansal
and Yaron (2004). We attempt to distinguish risk and uncertainty as sources of return volatility,
1Uncertainty aversion or ambiguity aversion follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Epstein and Wang (1994)
and Hansen and Sargent (2001).
2The maximum adjusted R2 value from the macroeconomic variables is around 90 %.
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further disentangle those into common and idiosyncratic parts, and investigate roles of the different
sources of return volatilities in explaining the cross sectional variations of returns. Our simple
theory offers two main testable implications.
First, we show that if there exists a fraction of IVOL common to each asset, this part can gen-
erate a negative relation to the portfolio returns sorted by IVOL, because of intertemporal hedging
motives as explained by Merton (1973). Cross-sectional stock returns are priced in response to sys-
tematic variations of return volatility. Merton (1973) develops an intertemporal capital asset pric-
ing model (ICAPM), according to which a risk-averse investor prefers to hold assets that perform
well when investment opportunities deteriorate, and the higher stock market volatility indicates
that economic conditions get worsened.
Second, our model also suggests that ambiguity produces a positive link between expected
return and return volatility for both systematic and idiosyncratic parts. Taken together, system-
atic components affecting the IVOL can have both positive and negative signs in their relation to
expected returns. Therefore, the sign of the relation is an empirical concern, depending on the rel-
ative sizes of the effects from each source of return volatility. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic
portion of IVOL will have a positive link to the expected returns.
To this end, we regress firm-level IVOL on those aggregate variable following Schwert (1989).
For a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty, we follow an asymptotic principal component method
in Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1988) to obtain common factors of analysts’ EPS forecast dis-
persion and use first several common dispersion factors as our measure of aggregate uncertainty
regarding future earnings. We refer to the fitted part of IVOL as the IVOL fitted by macroeco-
nomic or aggregate variables (m-IVOL), and the unexplained part of IVOL as the residual IVOL
(r-IVOL). By construction, the latter measure captures the extent to which IVOL is not induced by
macro-level fluctuations, and the former describes systematic variations linked to macro shocks.
In addition, we compute the product of each aggregate variable and its estimated regression coef-
ficient as the partially fitted IVOL corresponding to the specific regressor to gauge the individual
contribution toward explaining IVOL fluctuations. We then use the portfolio strategies that sort
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stocks on the size of this variable related to the components of IVOL at the end of each month and
form quintile value-weighted portfolios in the following month. Finally, we construct zero cost
portfolios based on the rankings to examine mean returns and alphas of these zero cost portfolios
with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor and Fama and French (2015) five-factor
models.
Using common stock samples from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database,
we find that a nontrivial portion of IVOL comes from systematic variations, and it indeed affects
stock returns through macroeconomic channels. The m-IVOL sorted stock returns are highly com-
patible with those based on IVOL. That is, the negative relation of the IVOL puzzle prevails when
m-IVOL is instead used for sorting. On the other hand, the result based on the residual component
of IVOL (r-IVOL) shows the opposite result. Zero cost portfolios sorted on r-IVOL has a positive
and statistically significant mean return of 0.534% and an alpha of 0.549% per month. Therefore,
the empirical findings are consistent with our model.
We also use regressions to test the explanatory power of these aggregate variables. We construct
return-based factors by using returns to these zero investment portfolios sorted on the partially fitted
IVOL by each aggregate variable. By augmenting a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with our
new return-based factors, we conduct time-series tests on zero cost IVOL portfolio. We show that
some return-based factors are significant determinants of IVOL portfolios, and several models can
price our portfolio correctly with insignificant abnormal return. We also present evidence that the
IVOL puzzle cannot be solely driven by small stocks, business cycles, or skewness preferences in
the sample.
Our empirical results have important implications on asset pricing theories. First, the existing
measure of idiosyncratic volatility, or IVOL can be a summary statistic for broader and more com-
plex volatility channels, rather than a proxy for purely idiosyncratic volatility. Second and related,
because the negative relation between IVOL and stock returns mainly comes from aggregate vari-
ables, this anomaly is likely to come from macroeconomic volatilities, business cycles, aggregate
uncertainty, or cash flow channels, rather than idiosyncratic variations of return volatility. Third, if
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idiosyncratic volatility refers to unsystematic part of firm risk, this can be positively priced, as sug-
gested by Schwert (1989), Merton (1987), Epstein and Schneider (2008), and other related papers,
according to the results from r-IVOL.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature, and
section 3.3 develops a simple economic model to motivate the study and write down testable hy-
potheses. Section 3.4 describes the data and our empirical strategy. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 present
our main results with various robustness checks. Then, we conclude in section 3.7.
3.2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to an empirical literature on explanations of the IVOL puzzle. Bali and
Cakici (2008) suggest that AHXZ (2006)’s results are sensitive to the research method and they
are not robust. They show that the return differences between the lowest and highest idiosyncratic
volatility quintile portfolios are sensitive to the idiosyncratic volatility breakpoints of the entire
sample or sub-samples used. Another explanation attributes the IVOL puzzle to market frictions.
Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2010) illustrate that AHXZ (2006)’s results are driven by monthly
stock return reversals and Fu (2009) has the same conclusion. Once controlling for the one-month
return reversal effect likely driven by microstructure biases, the negative relation between idiosyn-
cratic volatility and return is no longer significant. The third group of potential explanations of the
IVOL puzzle is related to the lottery preference of investors. Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2011) find
in January individual investors prefer lottery-type stocks which have high idiosyncratic volatility
because of a New Year’s gambling preference. As a result, there will be a positive relation between
idiosyncratic volatility and returns only in January and the negative relation between idiosyncratic
volatility and returns exists in the rest of the year. Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) show that the
IVOL puzzle is consistent with the investor preference for positive skewness in stock returns. Bali,
Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) find that IVOL puzzle can be explained by the preference of extreme
positive returns. The fourth group of explanations concerns firm’s fundamentals. For example,
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2013) show that many cross-sectional return anomalies,
including the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, exist only among financially distressed firms. Jiang,
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Xu, and Yao (2009) state that earnings shocks and selective information disclosure by firms mat-
ter for the IVOL puzzle, and Wong (2011) shows that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility
experience negative earnings shocks before and after portfolio formation, resulting in poor return
performance of those stocks. Chen and Petkova (2012) suggest that growth options associated with
average return variance can explain the IVOL puzzle. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) argue that
short-sale constraints play an important role in explaining the puzzle. The alternative channels
may work in part, but we show that the IVOL puzzle mainly comes from aggregate variations gen-
erating a negative relation with stock returns while the residual, or the idiosyncratic part of IVOL,
is actually positively related to stock returns.
Our paper is related to the literature studying systematic fluctuations of IVOL. Campbell, Let-
tau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2012) construct an aggregated
IVOL index to examine the time-series and cross-sectional behaviors of the idiosyncratic varia-
tions of stock returns. Duarte, Kamara, Siegel, and Sun (2014) and Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig, and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2015) show that there is a strong factor structure in firms’idiosyncratic volatil-
ity, and in the cross-section shocks to the common factor in idiosyncratic volatility are priced. We
share the spirit of extracting common variation from IVOL, yet we emphasize the role of observ-
able, macroeconomic variables instead of latent factors. Indeed, we find that IVOLs have multiple
common factors, and these common factors are in fact driven by macroeconomic variables, aggre-
gate corporate variables and aggregate forecast dispersion. In addition, we show that the residual
part of the IVOL, which we believe is close in spirit to idiosyncratic fluctuations of return volatility,
is significantly and positively priced in the cross section.
This paper connects to the literature on the stock return volatility. Schwert (1989) analyzes
a few macroeconomic factors which could be correlated to stock market volatility. He shows
that though macroeconomic volatility can weakly predict stock volatility, financial leverage and
trading volume growth seem to be important in affecting stock volatility. In this paper, we show
that a part of systematic variation of IVOL is actually related to these factors that are known
to explain or predict market volatility. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) study time-
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series behaviors of a weighted average of idiosyncratic volatilities of individual stocks for the US
market, and find that idiosyncratic volatilities significantly increased. Investigating 23 international
stock markets, Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2012) report that the upward trend disappears, if
extending the period to 2008. They show that growth opportunity, market volatility, and some
other macroeconomic variables are related to the aggregated IVOL index. We use those variables
in our set of macroeconomic determinants of IVOL.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on the uncertainty via the forecast dispersion.
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Johnson (2004), Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009),
Gallmeyer, Jhang, and Kim (2015), Kim (2015), and many others show that uncertainty via the
forecast dispersion should matter for asset pricing. We contribute to this strand of literature that
analyst forecast dispersion may serve as a channel through which firm-specific risk and uncertainty
affect expected return.
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we develop a simple continuous-time economic model to link return volatil-
ity to the cross section of returns. We attempt to distinguish risk and uncertainty as sources of
return volatility via incorporating ambiguity aversion into an asset pricing model with recursive
preferences. Recursive preference function in finance literature is popularized by Epstein and Zin
(1989, 1991) and Bansal and Yaron (2004), and the model helps resolve several prominent asset
pricing puzzles such as the equity premium puzzle. Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Kim, Lee, Park,
and Yeo (2009) show that the setup produces a volatility channel to determine asset prices as well.
In addition, uncertainty or ambiguity aversion can generate volatility channels of asset pricing,
according to Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Jeong, Kim, and Park
(2015). However, the existing literature did not separate roles of risk and uncertainty of return
volatilities in explaining the cross section of stock returns, and we tackle this issue.
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3.3.1 Setup
Following Jeong, Kim, and Park (2015), we begin by defining a standard d-dimensional Brow-
nian motion Wt =
(
W 1t , ...,W
d
t
)
on (Ω,F , P ) and the Brownian filtration (Ft)0≤t≤T , where Ft is
the σ-field generated by (W 1s , ...,W
d
s )s≤t. The time horizon is [0, T ], where T is finite. Suppose
that the representative investor does not know the true probability measure and has to select a sub-
jective probability measure from the set of all priorsP which are uniformly absolutely continuous
with respect to the true P in P. Duffie and Epstein (1992) show that for a fixed consumption
process C and a probability measure Q ∈ P, there exists a utility process V Qt uniquely solving
V Qt = EQ
[∫ T
t
f(Cs, V
Q
s )ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.1)
whereEQ(·|Ft) is the conditional expectation operator and f(C, V ) is called a normalized aggrega-
tor function linking current consumption and the future value. Using the martingale representation
theorem, we write equation (3.1) in a differential form of
dV Qt = −f(Ct, V Qt )dt+ σvt dWQt , (3.2)
where V QT = 0, (W
Q
t ) is the standard Brownian motion under Q-measure, and σvt is endogenously
determined. From now on, we use the functional form of
f(C, V ) =
C1−β − γ(αV ) 1−βα
(1− β)(αV ) 1−βα −1
(3.3)
for some γ ≥ 0, β 6= 1, α ≤ 1. This can be regarded as the continuous-time version of a utility
function introduced by Kreps and Porteus (1978), in which α and β measure the degree of relative
risk aversion (RRA) and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) respectively. Specifically,
the RRA is measured by (1 − α), and the EIS is 1/β. An important feature of the model is that
the consumer chooses a probability measure from available priors. To be specific, we assume that
the sets P of measures are equivalent to P . This is constructed by specifying suitable densities.
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We define a density generator to be an Rd-valued process θ = (θt) for which the process zθt is a
P-martingale, where
dzθt = −zθt θt · dWt, (3.4)
zθ0 = 1. (3.5)
θ generates a probability measure Qθ on (Ω,F) equivalent to P , i.e., dQθ
dP
|Ft = zθt for each t and
dQθ
dP
= zθT .Thus, given a set Θ of density generators, the corresponding set of priors is
PΘ =
{
Qθ : θ ∈ Θ and Qθ is defined by dQ
θ
dP
|Ft = zθt for each t and
dQθ
dP
= zθT
}
(3.6)
Following Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and Schneider (2003, 2007), we assume rect-
angularity to attain dynamic consistency.3 As Jeong, Kim, and Park (2015) argue, under this extra
layer of uncertainty, which leads to the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg (1961)), the min-max type of
value function
Vt = min
Q∈P
V Qt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.7)
is suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The multiple-priors recursive utility is given by
the lower envelope of the utility process (V Qt ), which is determined by the conditional expectation
of future consumption and utility values. Chen and Epstein (2002) show that there exists a unique
solution to equation (3.7) satisfying the dynamic consistency under certain conditions. Given the
statistical setup, the Girsanov transformation lies at the heart of constructing a set of priors P on
(Ω,FT ). Further, we fix a parameter κ = (κ1, ..., κd) in Rd+ and take
Θt (·) =
{
y ∈ Rd : |yi| ≤ κi for all i
}
, (3.8)
3Dynamic consistency in this paper is defined in the following sense. If two consumption plans c and c′ are the same
up to a stopping time τ , and the value Vτ of c is weakly preferred to that of c′ at τ almost surely, then V0(c) ≥ V0(c′)
almost surely with a strict inequality in the case that P{Vτ (c) > Vτ (c′)} > 0 holds.
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which is called κ−ignorance. Then, it is shown that
dVt = [−f(Ct, Vt) + κ · |σt|] dt+ σvt · dWt, (3.9)
VT = 0. (3.10)
The intertemporal marginal rate of substitution or the stochastic discount factor, denoted as Λ
is derived as
Λt = exp
∫ t
0
−γ − (1− α
1− β
) (C(1−β)s − γ (αVs) 1−βα )
(αVs)
1−β
α
 ds
C−βt (αVt)β−1α zκt . (3.11)
In comparison with the conventional stochastic discount factor without ambiguity aversion, it
is clear to see that ambiguity matters in equation (3.11). In the next subsection, we compute asset
returns implied by this theoretical model.
3.3.2 Theoretical Asset Prices
We assume that there exist d assets in the economy and denote the vector of instantaneous con-
ditional mean returns by b = [b1, ..., bd−1, bM ] and the vector of returns by R = [R1, ..., Rd−1, RM ],
and specify that the returns have the following forms: for i = 1, ..., d− 1, and M,
dRit = b
i
tdt+ φis
d
tdW
d
t + s
i
tdW
i
t , (3.12)
dRMt = b
M
t dt+ s
d
tdW
d
t , (3.13)
where φi measures the co-variation of an asset i with the common (i.e., macroeconomic) Brownian
motion shock W d and bt is to be endogenously determined.
By construction, W d refers to an aggregate shock andW i, i = 1, ...d−1 stand for idiosyncratic
shocks, and we assume that the aggregate stock market return (RM ) does not depend on individual
Brownian motions. Extending the dimension of W d to a multivariate vector is straightforward,
and the convention that the asset M has W d as the only Brownian motion shock reflects that the
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idiosyncratic shocks get diversified away in case of the aggregate stock market. In our empirical
application, we use multiple macroeconomic variables.
Note that the conditional return variance V art(dRit) is computed as φ2i (s
d
t )
2 + (sit)
2. Because
the estimated portion of returns by pricing factors capture the drift term bit for i = 1, ..., d, the
conventional IVOL à la AHXZ (2006) is defined as φ2i (s
d
t )
2 + (sit)
2, netting out the contribution
from the risk factors.
We argue that the more relevant idiosyncratic return variance under this setup should be (sit)
2,
obtained from further purging out the common component (φ2i (s
d
t )
2). The conventional defini-
tion of IVOL hinges upon the idea that idiosyncratic shocks are identifiable by controlling for the
common pricing factors. However, the cross section of return volatilities can have a factor struc-
ture as well, as illustrated above. In this light, sdt measures a common, macroeconomic volatility
component, and (s1t , ..., s
d−1
t ) refers the idiosyncratic part of return volatility (IVOL).
To solve for the asset returns, we define that aggregate consumption process (Ct) as
dCt
Ct
= µctdt+ s
c
t · dWt, (3.14)
where sct =
[
s1,ct , ..., s
d−1,c
t , s
d,c
t
]
. Equation (3.14) indicates that consumption can depend on all d
sources of shocks represented by (W )t, and sct refers to co-variations with each shock. Thus, the
sources of consumption shocks include, but are not limited to the aggregate risk. This is because
consumption depends on aggregate wealth, denoted asG, and the market can be incomplete so that
the representative investor is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. It is well known
that solving the model, for each i = 1, ..., d− 1,M , we have
bit − rft =
[
αβ
1− βCovt
(
dCt
Ct
, dRit
)
+
(
1− α
1− β
)
Covt
(
dRGt , dR
i
t
)]
+ [φis
d
t , s
i
t] · θ∗t , (3.15)
where RGt represents the returns on aggregate wealth, and θ
∗
t is the optimal choice of θ. According
to Chen and Epstein (2002), θ∗t is determined by setting θ
∗
t = κ ⊗ sgn (sct) under a Markovian
setting with κ-ignorance. Equation (3.15) states that the conditional mean component of the asset
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returns will be determined by an ambiguity premium associated with the market and idiosyncratic
shocks as well as the conventional conditional covariations of returns with consumption growth
and returns from the aggregate wealth.
Under the Markovian setting and κ−ignorance with the rectangularity assumption, we can
write down (3.15) as follows:
bit − rft =
αβ
1− βCovt
(
dCt
Ct
, dRit
)
+
(
1− β − α
1− β
)
Covt
(
dRGt , dR
i
t
)
(3.16)
+ κdφisgn(s
d,c
t )s
d
t + κisgn(s
i,c
t )s
i
t,
where sgn (·) is the sign function (i.e., positive or negative of the argument).
The conditional mean part of the asset returns computed in equation (3.16) describes that pre-
miums for holding an asset i are due to risks from consumption growth, changes in aggregate
wealth, and ambiguities from aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in the economy. To better un-
derstand the relation between volatility and the expected returns, we now make some additional
assumptions to identify the model of asset returns.
Assumption 1: sgn(sd,ct ) > 0 and sgn(s
i,c
t ) > 0 for all i and t.
Assumption 2: For each i, sgn(si,ct ) does not change over time, though it varies across assets.
Assumption 3: κ1 = ... = κd−1 = κ.
Assumption 4 (Early Resolution of Uncertainty): α < 0 and 0 < β < 1.
Assumption 1 implies that the correlations between consumption and asset returns are positive.
Although the magnitudes of covariance between consumption growth and stock returns are known
to be small, the positive sign of the co-variations is well supported in data. For instance, sample
correlation between aggregate consumption and the market return is known to be around 0.2 to
0.3, according to previous studies. Assumptions 2 and 3 are mainly for tractability and can be
relaxed. In particular, Assumption 3 means that ambiguity boundary for an individual shock is the
same across assets i. Although we suspect that the boundary (κi) can be bigger for assets with
higher idiosyncratic volatilities (sit), we take a conservative stance to assume that all idiosyncratic
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shocks can be equally ambiguous. Assumption 4 states a condition to guarantee early resolution of
uncertainty. According to Epstein and Zin (1989) and more generally Brown and Kim (2013), if
relative risk aversion is greater than the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the
investor prefers early resolution of uncertainty. Bansal and Yaron (2004) show that this creates an
important risk channel to resolve the equity premium puzzle. This hypothesis has been empirically
tested by several studies, such as Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2010), Kim, Lee, Park, and Yeo (2009),
and Jeong, Kim, and Park (2015) to show that data support the early resolution of uncertainty.
Then, for i = 1, ..., d− 1, M , we have
dRit = b
i
tdt+ φis
d
tdW
d
t + s
i
tdW
i
t , (3.17)
dRMt = b
M
t dt+ s
d
tdW
d
t (3.18)
with
bit − rft =
αβ
1− βCovt
(
dCt
Ct
, dRit
)
+
(
1− α
1− β
)
Covt
(
dRGt , dR
i
t
)
+ κdφis
d
t + κs
i
t, (3.19)
bMt − rft =
αβ
1− βCovt
(
dCt
Ct
, dRMt
)
+
(
1− α
1− β
)
Covt
(
dRGt , dR
M
t
)
+ κds
d
t . (3.20)
Note that both idiosyncratic return volatility and systematic volatility affect expected returns of
individual assets. The first part of the right hand side of equation (3.19) ( αβ
1−βCovt (dCt/Ct, dR
i
t))
refers to the terms related to the consumption CAPM. The second part shows the association be-
tween individual asset returns and aggregate wealth, which is known to be proxied by empirical
asset pricing factors. Finally, ambiguity aversion affects the last two terms of the equation (3.19).
It is clear that both resolution of uncertainty via long-run risk channel (α, β) and ambiguity aver-
sion (κd, κi) determine expected returns through return volatilities. Jeong, Kim, and Park (2015)
estimate versions of the model (3.19) for the aggregate stock market return to show that ambiguity
aversion plays an instrumental role to explain the historic equity premium.
To check this more precisely, we exploit a property of the model that consumption-wealth ratio
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is a function of state variables. Denote the consumption-aggregate ratio by At, or Ct = AtGt
holds. Chen and Epstein (2002) show that A is a function of state variables, denoted as X , and the
value function from equation (3.7) satisfies the following form V = Ψ(A)Gα/α with Ψ′(A) > 0.
Using Ito’s lemma, we know that the following relation holds.
dCt
Ct
=
dAt
At
+
dGt
Gt
+
dAt
At
dGt
Gt
. (3.21)
Then, we can compute
bit − rft = (1− α)Covt
(
dRGt , dR
i
t
)
+
αβ
1− βCovt
(
dAt
At
, dRit
)
+ κdφis
d
t + κs
i
t. (3.22)
To specify the process for At, we use Merton (1973)’s intertemporal capital asset pricing model
(ICAPM), which assumes the state variable to be latent. In particular, The process forX determines
the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio, and is defined as
dXt = κx (θ −Xt) dt+ σxdW xt , (3.23)
in which W x is a standard Brownian motion and the correlation with W d is denoted as ρdxdt.4
Then, using Stein’s lemma , we can express the above equation as
bit − rft = (1− α)Covt
(
dRGt , dR
i
t
)
+
(
αβ
1− β
)
A′(Xt)
(
φiρdxσxs
d
t
)
+ κdφis
d
t + κs
i
t, (3.24)
for i = 1, ..., d− 1.
If the correlation (ρdxdt) is positive, this means that the state variable (X) tends to move in
the same direction as the stock market return (dRM ). According to Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
and many related studies, it is well known that A and dRM have a positive relation. Therefore,
it is plausible to assume that the signs of A′(X) and ρdx are the same. (i.e., A′(X) > (<)0 and
ρdx > (<)0.) For instance, if X proxies for business cycle fluctuations, positive shocks to X can
4Extending the setup to include multiple state variables is straightforward and hence omitted.
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increase both consumption and stock return simultaneously.
Equation (3.24) shows that premiums for holding assets can depend on multiple risk factors and
return volatilities. In addition, aggregate return volatility and idiosyncratic return volatilities pro-
duce premiums due to both risk channels and uncertainty channels. The next subsection scrutinizes
how these channels determine the cross section of stock returns.
3.3.3 Volatilities and Returns
We compare expected stock returns of high volatilities with those of low volatilities. Suppose
that two assets H and L differ in that φH > φL and sHt > s
L
t hold. That is, although it is not
necssary, it suffices to say that asset H has the higher IVOL than asset L in the sense of AHXZ
(2006). Then, using equation (3.24), we can compute the expected returns of a zero-cost portfolio
consisting of returns sorted by IVOL:
Et
(
dRHt − dRLt
)
= (1− α)Covt
(
dRGt , dR
H
t − dRLt
)
(3.25)
+ (φH − φL)
(
αβ
1− β
)
A′(Xt)ρdxσxsdt
+ κd (φH − φL) sdt + κ
(
sHt − sLt
)
.
Equation (3.25) states that the zero cost portfolio sorted by the size of IVOL will depend on risk
factors associated with aggregate wealth, aggregate return volatilities, and the residual parts of the
IVOL. It is important to note that the first component in the right-hand-side of equation (3.25)
captures a conventional risk premium known to be captured by several empirical asset pricing
factors such as the market, book-to-market, size, and momentum factors. Because risk aversion
(1 − α) is positive from Assumption 4, this term is positive, provided that the covariance term is
positive.
The second term is related to the resolution of uncertainty as well as time-varying and stochastic
investment opportunity set. From Assumption 4, αβ/(1 − β) < 0 holds. Then, the sign of
the second term is negative, because φH is greater than φL. That is, the contribution from the
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aggregate return volatility can lead to a negative relation to the cross-sectional portfolio, when
investment opportunity set (X) co-moves with the aggregate consumption-wealth ratio. The last
two terms are due to ambiguity aversion, and it is easy to infer that both terms are positive.
To summarize, our simple theory offers key testable hypotheses. First, if there exists a fraction
of IVOL which is common to each asset, this part can generate a negative relation to the portfolio
returns sorted by IVOL, from the intertemporal hedging demand. Second, ambiguity produces a
positive link between expected returns and return volatilities for both systematic and idiosyncratic
volatilities. In the next section, we empirically test the hypotheses.
3.4 Data
This section describes data series used and constructed in this paper. Table B.1 provides sum-
mary statistics of the data set, and Figures B.2 and B.3 provide time-series plots of several key
variables in the data. Table B.1 consists of four panels. Panel A reports characteristics of stock
returns: average return, return volatility, and return IVOL at firm-month level. Panel B shows sum-
mary statistics regarding aggregate variables used in the previous literature to explain stock market
volatility. Panel C presents summary statistics about analysts forecast dispersions at firm level. We
notice that the firm-month observations shrink in this case. It is mainly because analysts forecast
dispersion data set in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) is not available until
1976. Panel D reports the average adjusted R2 values from regressing firm-level forecast disper-
sions onto the common factors of forecast dispersions to measure the importance of the common
variations of analyst forecast dispersions. In the below, we explain the data set in detail.
3.4.1 Estimating the Idiosyncratic Volatility
The stock data sample includes all common equities (share codes 10 or 11) on the NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. At least 17
daily observations are required. The sample period is from July 1963 to December 2012. Following
AHXZ (2006)’s approach, we define idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) as the standard deviation of
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residuals (it) in the Fama and French (1993, 1996) regression (FF-3F) given as follows:
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + it. (3.26)
That is, in each month, IVOL is computed as the sample analogue of
√
V ar(it) using daily
returns for each firm i in the CRSP database.
3.4.2 Aggregate Variables Related to Stock Return Volatility
Following Schwert (1989), we consider aggregate variables related to stock volatility. Macroe-
conomic variables including the volatility of the monetary base growth, inflation volatility and
the volatility of industry production growth, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
based recession indicators, credit spread and term spread can be important in explaining stock re-
turn volatility. The volatility of stock returns can result from the volatilities of inflation or money
growth, especially if market participants perceive that the overall economy is uncertain about future
direction of monetary policy and liquidity conditions. Similarly, real macroeconomic volatility can
be correlated to stock return volatility, because common stocks are the claims on future firm per-
formances, and the volatility of future profits is likely to change if aggregate real activity fluctuates
over time.
In addition, we use aggregated corporate and financial variables, such as cash-flow-to-price
ratio, dividend-to-price ratio, leverage, and trading volume. Cash-flow-to-price ratio and dividend-
to-price ratio, known as variables predicting future returns, can explain return volatility, because
these variables tend to forecast stock returns persistently with multiple horizons. If these predictors
proxy for aggregate state variables which are closely linked to future expected returns over multiple
periods, both returns and return volatilities can be connected via these forecasting variables.
Trading volume measures how actively financial transactions occur. Heterogeneous beliefs,
arrival of new information, and market liquidity conditions can jointly affect the trading volume
and return volatility, as pointed out by Schwert (1989). Emphasizing the role of macroeconomic
fluctuations, we use the aggregated trading volume of stock market.
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3.4.2.1 Macroeconomic Variables
Data of the monetary base and industry production index are from the Federal Reserve Board,
and consumer price index (CPI) is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As in Schwert (1989), we
estimate the volatility of the monetary base growth (∆Mvol), of the inflation (INFLvol) and of
the industry production growth (∆IP vol) by the following procedures:
(i) Estimate a 12th-order autoregression with different monthly intercepts (Dt) for the growth rates
Xt:
Xt =
12∑
j=1
αjDjt +
12∑
i=1
βiXt−i + εt. (3.27)
and (ii) The absolute values of the fitted errors from (3.27), |εˆt|, estimate the monthly volatility.
We also include NBER based Recession Indicators (Recessiont), which is equal to 1 in a re-
cessionary period or 0 in an expansionary period. We calculate the credit spread between Moody’s
Baa corporate bond yield and Aaa yield (Y ieldt) , and the term spread (Termt) between 10-year
Treasury rate and 1-year Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve Board.
3.4.2.2 Aggregated Corporate and Financial Variables
We use the CRSP/Compustat Merged Quarterly Data set and calculate Cash-Flow-to-Price
ratio (CP ), Dividend-to-Price ratio (DP ) and leverage (Lev) for each firm at the end of each
fiscal quarter. Leverage is defined as the book value of long term debt divided by book value of
assets. Given that our IVOL measure is computed at monthly frequency, we follow Irvine and
Pontiff (2009) to produce monthly estimates of the above ratios. CPit (DPit, Levit) is the firm
i’s accounting ratio at time t. If time t does not correspond to the end of the firm’s quarter, CPit
(DPit, Levit) reflects either the quarterly accounting ratio that was reported in the previous month
or the quarterly accounting ratio that was reported in the following month. After having monthly
series of these ratios for each firm, we calculate the value weighted average among all firms for
each month. Finally, we compute trading volume (Tvlmt) as the value weighted average of firm
level traded shares over total shares outstanding in each month.
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3.4.3 Analysts Forecast Dispersion
Recent studies such as Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), Epstein and Schneider (2008),
Kim (2015), and Jeong, Kim, and Park (2015) show close relations among return volatility, am-
biguity, and analyst forecast dispersions. Based on this idea, we further decompose firm-level
analyst forecast dispersions into common and idiosyncratic fluctuations in order to pair systematic
and residual return volatilities to common and idiosyncratic components of forecast dispersions.
For analysts forecast dispersion at firm level, we follow the procedure in Diether, Malloy, and
Scherbina (2002). We use I/B/E/S for the data on analysts’ earnings-per-share (EPS) 1Y (1 year)
forecast. For each stock in CRSP, we calculate its dispersion as the standard deviation of EPS fore-
cast divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast. We then use the asymptotic principal
component method in Connor and Korajczyk (1986, 1988) to obtain common factors of analyst
forecast dispersion.
Each month we regress firm-level analyst forecast dispersion (DISPit) on up to first ten com-
mon factors from the asymptotic principal component analysis and obtain adjusted R2:
DISPit = αi + β
′
iFt + uit. (3.28)
Panel D of Table B.1 reports adjusted R2 using up to four common factors, which is also
the total variance explained by common dispersion factors. We only include the first four factors
because each additional common factor after the fourth factor only increases the explained variance
by less than three percent.
We believe that analysts try to predict individual firms’ earnings based on firms’ likely re-
sponses to aggregate shocks as well as idiosyncratic shocks affecting earnings. Although the extent
and amount of reactions of individual firms differ from each other, the the degree of co-movement
will be stronger for those against aggregate shocks. This can be reflected upon the degree and com-
monality of uncertainty that analysts estimate as well. In this light, we use the first four common
dispersion factors as our measure of aggregate analysts forecast dispersion. The first four factors
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explain slightly more than one quarter (27%) of the variation in total. Thus, the first impression is
that there exist common variations of forecast dispersions, capturing uncertainty about earnings as-
sociated with macroeconomic fluctuations. In addition, a significant portion of forecast dispersion
comes from idiosyncratic variations.
Panel (F) of Figure B.2 shows the time series plot of the first common factor. The first common
factor of analyst dispersion is higher in early and mid-1980s, and becomes significantly lower in
1990s, correctly depicting the period of great moderation. Then, it shows some spikes in early
2000s, consistent with the period of credit crunch and the 9/11 tragic event. Then, it surges up
since the period of financial crisis of 2007-2009 period. Overall, the common dispersion factor
describes changes in macroeconomic level of uncertainty, consistent with other studies such as
Kim, Lee, Park, and Yeo (2009).
3.5 Main Results
This section presents the main results of the paper. The next subsection reproduces the results
by AHXZ (2006), extending the period. Then, we verify if the aggregate variables selected in
the previous section can explain stock market volatility, reproducing and extending the results by
Schwert (1989). In section A.4, IVOLs of individual stock returns are projected onto the macro
factors to compute m−IVOL (common IVOL) and r−IVOL (residual IVOL) to analyze how these
affect the cross section of stock returns. Finally, we compute factor-mimicking portfolios to ana-
lyze if the part of IVOL fitted by each aggregate variable plays a role in pricing the portfolio sorted
by IVOL.
3.5.1 The Idiosyncratic Volatility Puzzle
Table B.2 reports monthly percentage returns of portfolios sorted by IVOL. In each month, we
sort stocks into quintile value-weighted portfolios on the basis of idiosyncratic volatility computed
using daily returns over the previous month. We hold these portfolios for one month and rebalance
them at the end of each month. We examine the differences in both raw average returns and
abnormal returns between the highest IVOL and lowest IVOL portfolio. Panel A replicates Table
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VI of AHXZ (2006). The results are similar to their main findings. The quintile portfolio of stocks
with the highest IVOL has a raw average return -1.050% lower than that with the lowest IVOL
(-1.06% in AHXZ (2006)). The difference in CAPM alpha between the highest IVOL portfolio
and the lowest IVOL portfolio is -1.375% per month (-1.38% in AHXZ (2006)). Fama-French 3-
Factor (FF-3F) alpha difference between the highest IVOL portfolio and the lowest IVOL portfolio
is -1.344% per month, which is also statistically significant (-1.31% in AHXZ (2006)).
In Panel B, we extend AHXZ (2006)’s sample period by twelve years to December 2012.
Again, we obtain similar patterns, and the IVOL puzzle still exists. The difference in raw average
returns is -0.870% per month. Both CAPM and FF-3F model are unable to price these portfolios
correctly since the differences in alphas between the highest IVOL portfolio and the lowest IVOL
portfolio are significantly negative. The difference in CAPM alpha between the highest IVOL
portfolio and the lowest IVOL portfolio is -1.220% per month, with a t-statistic of -4.42. Further,
FF-3F alpha difference between the highest IVOL portfolio and the lowest IVOL portfolio is -
1.279% per month, with a t-statistic of -6.78. Panel C verifies if the IVOL puzzle prevails under
different business cycle regimes, and Panel D reports the results excluding the penny stocks to
see if the results are driven by micro-cap stocks, as argued by the existing papers. Both show
that the IVOL puzzle is significant. Overall, the IVOL puzzle prevails significantly in our sample,
consistent with the finding of Jiang, Xu, and Yao (2009).
3.5.2 Explaining Market Volatility
Do the aggregate variables introduced in section 3.4 matter to account for stock return volatil-
ity? We test the explanatory power of our candidate variables in explaining monthly market volatil-
ity. Market volatility (MKT vol) is measured as the standard deviation of excess market return
within each month using daily returns. In Table B.3, we regress the logarithm market volatility
(Ln(MKT vol)) on candidate variables (Xt) and obtain the estimates of coefficients (β) as shown
in the following regression,
Ln(MKT vol)t = α + β′iXt + uit. (3.29)
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Model 1 specification is due to Schwert (1989). We also run regressions using other macroeco-
nomics variables and aggregate corporate variables as in Models 2, 3 and 4. The results in Model
1 are broadly consistent with the existing studies. For instance, the average level of volatility is
lower in expansions and is higher in recessions. Adjusted R2 under this specification is 0.1958,
similar to Schwert (1989)’s finding of a R2 of 0.208. In addition, credit spread (Y ield), reces-
sion (Recession), dividend-to-price ratio (DP ) and trading volume (Tvlm) are vital in explaining
the market volatility. Moreover, Schwert (1989) suggests that although these aggregate variables
explain fluctuations of market return volatility, macroeconomic uncertainty can play an important
role in understanding time-varying and excessive return volatility observed in the data. Following
this view, we augment Model 4 with aggregate dispersion factors and refers to those as Model 5
and Model 6. Table B.3 shows that the first common factor (Disp1t ) and the third common factor
(Disp3t ) have significantly positive associations with the market volatility, although the second and
fourth factors are insignificant. Adjusted R2 under this specification is around 0.51, which is more
than twice in comparison with that of Model 1. Thus, many factors affect stock market volatility,
and the aggregate level of uncertainty can be an important determinant of return volatility.
3.5.3 Portfolios Sorted by IVOL Determinants
What drives the IVOL puzzle? Can aggregate variables known to explain market return volatil-
ity shed light on this anomaly? If so, what is the relation between stock return and the idiosyncratic
volatility after netting out the macroeconomic effect? We scrutinize these issues, using portfolio-
sorting strategies. Our empirical strategy is straightforward. In the first stage, we regress the time
series of individual stock IVOL on candidate variables (Xt) and obtain the estimates of coeffi-
cients5:
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit. (3.30)
Second, we sort stocks on the size of γˆjiX
j
t for the variable X
j
t at the end of each month and
form quintile value-weighted portfolios based upon the sorting for the following month. Finally,
5Note that the coefficients αi and γ′i are time-invariant, and we use the same estimates in our sorting procedure to
focus on the variations of Xt, rather than γi.
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we construct a zero cost portfolio of buying the stock with the highest γˆjiX
j
t ranking and shorting
the stock with the lowest γˆjiX
j
t ranking. We hold this portfolio for one month and re-balance it at
the end of each month. Here we refer to γˆjiX
j
t as the partially fitted IVOL related to variable X
j
t .
In addition, we repeat the procedure for the whole fitted part of IVOL, m−IVOL, and the residual,
r−IVOL as the sorting variable. This method serves two purposes in answering the questions
raised above. First, studying the relations between return volatility and expected return has been
one of the key problems in finance, and the theories state that the sign of this relation can be either
positive or negative. By looking at the returns sorted by the IVOL coming from the individual
variable Xjt as well as all the variables as a whole, we can shed light on the volatility channels
affecting the cross section of stock returns. Second, the residual component of IVOL (r−IVOL) is
closer in spirit to the “idiosyncratic” part of return volatility. Thus, by analyzing the returns sorted
by the r−IVOL, we investigate the effects of idiosyncratic volatility risk on returns, and compare
those with the findings of the existing studies.
3.5.3.1 Macroeconomic Variables Related to IVOL
We now study the roles of the variables explaining stock market volatility in affecting the IVOL
puzzle. To this end, Table B.4 shows both raw average returns and abnormal returns of zero cost
portfolios formed by sorting stock returns using the aggregate variables. The fitted IVOL refers
to the result sorted by all the explained part of IVOL by the macroeconomic variables. The result
states that the significantly negative pattern emerges, consistent with AHXZ (2006). Thus, the
IVOL puzzle is likely to come from macroeconomic fluctuations. Among ten variables, three of
them seem to be important. Zero cost portfolios sorted on the partially fitted IVOL related to the
term spread (Termt), dividend-to-price ratio (DPt) and the trading activity (Tvlmt) have statisti-
cally significant negative raw mean returns of −0.238% ,−0.409% and −0.679% respectively, and
alphas of −0.310%, −0.521% and −0.751% with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model respectively.
We also form portfolios sorted on the residual idiosyncratic volatility, εˆit. Interestingly, the
zero cost portfolio yields a positive mean return of 0.722% and an alpha of 0.668%, which are all
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statistically significant with Newey-West t-statistics of 3.09 and 2.92 respectively. This finding is
in line with economic theories that there should be a positive relation between IVOL and expected
returns. Especially, it is consistent with Merton (1987) that in an incomplete market setting, in-
vestors require higher returns for holding stocks with larger firm-specific variance and not being
able to fully diversify their portfolios. In addition, ambiguity aversion can lead to a positive link as
well, as shown by Epstein and Schneider (2008).
Overall, results from Table B.4 suggest that the IVOL puzzle is a result of combined forces. On
one hand, the part of IVOL that is explained by aggregate variables, mainly the term spread, the
dividend-to-price ratio and trading activity, generates the negative IVOL-return relation. In other
words, IVOL computed by AHXZ (2006) is not truly idiosyncratic and it comes from systematic
variations related to stock market volatility. Note that these variables are highly related to busi-
ness cycle fluctuations which affect business opportunities. Thus, this result is consistent with the
key implication of Merton’s intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM): If return volatil-
ity varies due to changes in investment opportunities, hedging demand can explain the negative
relation between expected returns and volatility.
On the other hand, r−IVOL, i.e., the residual part of IVOL is in fact positively associated with
stock returns. By construction, r−IVOL is uncorrelated with the common fluctuations of IVOL,
and the data set of portfolio returns sorted by r−IVOL provides a good laboratory to examine if an
idiosyncratic risk or uncertainty is priced in the stock market. If there exists no market friction and
complete market prevails, this type of risk and uncertainty should be diversified away. Our results
imply that this is not the case.
3.5.3.2 Aggregate Analysts Forecast Dispersion
We consider another potential channel through which IVOL affects stock returns. We con-
struct aggregate analysts’ EPS forecast dispersion as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty related to
economy-wide profitability as mentioned earlier. Again, we use portfolio sorting strategies to ex-
amine how partially fitted IVOL related to aggregate analysts forecast dispersion affects expected
return. To this end, in Table B.5, we include all the aggregate variables in the equation (3.30), and
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sort stocks on the partially fitted IVOL as well as all the fitted IVOL.
Most notably, the common factors of earnings forecast dispersion matter in that the zero-cost
portfolio constructed from the summation of the partially fitted IVOL related to each of the com-
mon factor yields significantly positive mean return and alpha at 1% level.6 The channels through
which forecast dispersions affect stock returns can be both positive or negative. Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002) argue that there exists a negative relation between forecast dispersion and
stock returns due to the existence of short sale constraints. On the other hand, existing literature
focusing on ambiguity or uncertainty aversion claims a positive link based upon the notion of
uncertainty-return tradeoff. In our case, we filter this channel through the lens of return volatility,
and which effect dominates is an empirical concern. Thus, our result shows that a positive uncer-
tainty premium exists for holding stocks, and this can weaken the negative relation between stock
returns and return volatilities.
Regarding macroeconomic variables, similar to the result in Table B.4, Table B.5 shows that
the total fitted IVOL shows a significantly negative IVOL effect, reproducing the AHXZ (2006)’s
finding, and the portfolio returns sorted on r−IVOL are positive. The mean return from the fit-
ted IVOL is around −1.37% for the mean return and −1.62% for the abnormal returns, which
is quite comparable to the results in Table B.2. Volatility risks related to macroeconomic risks
as a whole are priced negatively, suggesting that investors demand these firms to hedge against
macroeconomic volatility risks. 7 For the latter, r−IVOL, the results are robust at 1% significance
level, with a mean return of 0.534% and an alpha of 0.549%. This finding implies that purely
idiosyncratic risks price the cross-section of stock returns in a positive fashion.
Examining individual variables used to explain IVOL, most of the variables show negative
relations. Some aggregate variables, such as money growth volatility, output growth volatility, re-
cession, and the aggregate trading volume show negative relations, but their statistical significances
are marginally significant or insignificant. Zero cost portfolios sorted on the partially fitted IVOL
6To conserve space, we did not report the results from cases with each common forecast dispersion factor included.
Results are similar, and available upon request.
7We also construct a zero-cost portfolio from the summation of the macroeconomic variables, and mean return and
alpha are significantly negative.
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related to term spread (Termt) and the dividend-to-price ratio (DPt) remain robust in the sense
that mean return are -0.233% and -0.312% respectively, which are all statistically significant, and
alphas are also significant at 1% level. Moreover, mean return and abnormal return of the zero
cost portfolio sorted on credit spread (Y ieldt) becomes negative and statistically significant in this
specification. It realizes a mean return of -0.350% with a t-statistic of -2.06, and an abnormal
return of -0.537% at 1% significance level.
However, there also exist zero-cost portfolios that have opposite signs of mean return and
alpha compared to Table B.4. For example, in Table B.4, zero cost portfolio sorted on the leverage
(Leveraget)-related fitted IVOL has marginally significant, negative returns. Nevertheless, in our
full specification with uncertainty channel, the magnitude of returns and their t-statistics increase a
lot. The mean return is 0.170% per month and the alpha is 0.218%, which is statistically significant.
In sum, under the specifications used in Tables B.4 and B.5, it is evident that macroeconomic
variables are capable of explaining the IVOL of each firm. The IVOL puzzle is driven mostly by
the systematic variation related to risk priced in the market via the volatility channel. In addi-
tion, IVOL can affect stock returns through the uncertainty channel, proxied by aggregate forecast
dispersion factors. However, aggregate uncertainty affects stock returns positively, generating pos-
itive uncertainty premiums. Regarding the effects of idiosyncratic risk, the residual part of IVOL
is positively related to expected returns, as suggested by Merton (1987) and Epstein and Schneider
(2008).
3.5.4 Regression Results Using Factor-Mimicking Portfolios
So far, our results from portfolio strategies suggest that IVOL can be explained by some sys-
tematic variations related to both stock market volatility and aggregate uncertainty regarding fu-
ture earnings. In this subsection, we use a return-based regression approach to test the explanatory
power of these aggregate variables.
Given that our zero cost portfolios in Table B.4 and Table B.5 are directly sorted on the size
of γˆjiX
j
t , or X
j
t -related fitted IVOL for each macro variable j, we can use returns to these zero
investment portfolios as additional return-based factors. A zero investment portfolio sorted on
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IVOL serves as our main test asset. We first test the CAPM model using this test asset. As shown
in the first column of Table 6, CAPM model is unable to price this asset correctly in the sense that
it would yield an abnormal return of -1.220% per month at 1% significance level.
Next, we augment the CAPM model with our return-based factors. We can see from Models
2 to Model 5 in Table B.6 that the time-series intercept alpha decreases in both magnitude and
t-statistics. The zero cost portfolio sorted on IVOL will earn an alpha around -0.25%, but this
abnormal return is statistically insignificant under the models including the portfolios mimicking
IVOL using macro variables. In fact, some return-based factors are significant determinants of
IVOL portfolios. Credit spread (Y ield), Cash-Flow-to-price (CP ) and trading activity (Tvlm)-
related factors have positive loadings while inflation (INFLvol), leverage (Lev) and aggregate
dispersion (Disp1t ) -related factors are negatively related to the portfolio return. In sum, the IVOL
portfolio returns are well explained by the macroeconomic variables explaining the IVOL.
3.6 Robustness Checks and Discussions
In this section, we perform robustness tests. We begin with using alternative IVOL measures as
argued by several authors. Next, we check if our results are robust to preferences about skewness.
Then, we further discuss the associations between IVOL and uncertainty.
3.6.1 Alternative IVOL measures
As discussed in earlier sections, our IVOL measure is estimated using daily returns over the
previous month. However, Bali and Cakici (2008) also consider another IVOL measure that is
based on the previous 24 to 60 monthly returns, and Fu (2009) uses a generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. Inspired by their measures, we use monthly return
data to compute IVOL as well. We resort to the following GARCH (1,1) model using monthly data
and IVOL is estimated as the standard deviation of it.
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + it, (3.31)
E((it)
2|Ωt−1) = σ2it = θi0 + θi1(it−1)2 + θi2(σit−1)2 (3.32)
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As before, in each month we sort stocks and form the zero cost portfolio based on this new
IVOL measure over the previous month. Table B.7 reports the mean and abnormal return of the
zero cost portfolio. Contrary to Bali and Cakici (2008)’s finding, there exists a negative and sig-
nificant relation between this new IVOL measure and the expected returns, and IVOL puzzle still
exists, according to the results in Model A.
To test the explanatory power of our return-based factors used in the previous section, we
include them in Model B to re-estimate a new IVOL as the standard deviation of the residual term.
As shown in Table B.7, the zero-cost portfolios sorted on these IVOL measures show that both the
magnitude and the significance are significantly reduced by a large amount compared to Model
A. As robustness checks, we also use GARCH(1,1) in Fama and French (2015) five-factor model
with and without our return-based factors to estimate IVOLs. A very similar pattern arises, and
our factor mimicking factor works reasonably well.
Thus far, we use the holding return data to estimate IVOL without distinguishing capital gains
and cash flows. Next, we decompose the holding returns into two parts based on the following
definition
Holding Period Return = Pit−Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
+ Dit
Pi,t−1
.
We denote Pit−Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
as the capital gain and Dit
Pi,t−1
as the cash flow return. Accordingly, we could
re-estimate our IVOL measures based on these two different returns, and check our main findings.
Table B.8 reports the results. First, we sort stocks on capital gain IVOL (IV OLx) and the cash
flow return IVOL(IV OLr) respectively, and form zero cost portfolios. As shown in the table, the
zero cost portfolio sorted on IV OLx has negative and significant raw and abnormal return while
the one sorted on IV OLr does not. It indicates that the IVOL puzzle mainly comes from capital
gain or the return without dividend part. Then we regress the capital gain IVOL (IV OLx) on our
aggregate variables, and obtain the fitted capital gain IVOL and the residual capital gain IVOL.
Consistent with the main finding in Table B.5, the fitted capital gain IVOL generates the negative
relation between the IVOL measure and the expected return, while the zero cost portfolio sorted
on the residual capital gain IVOL has a positive and significant raw and abnormal return. Thus,
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our main findings remain robust.
3.6.2 Lottery and Skewness
One potential explanation of the IVOL puzzle is related to the lottery preference of investors.
Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2011) find stocks with strong lottery features typically have high
idiosyncratic volatility, and outperform stocks with weak lottery features in January but not neces-
sarily the other months. Their explanation is that because of a New Year’s gambling preference,
stock market gamblers chase after these stocks, inducing a positive relation between IVOL and the
expected return only in January and the negative relation between IVOL and expected returns in
the remainder of year. They suggest that the negative relation in non-January months suggests a
correction of overpricing of the lottery-type stocks caused by investor preference of speculative
features. Following Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2011), we split our monthly return data into Jan-
uary returns and non-January returns. According to Table B.9, raw mean returns in January are
strongly positive and negative in non-January months, consistent with the finding of Doran, Jiang,
and Peterson (2011). However, when risk adjustment is made using Fama-French 3 factors, the
effect becomes insignificant. More importantly, the r-IVOL effect prevails both in January and
non-January months, showing a positive relation between IVOL and stock returns. In fact, both
January and non-January effect are roughly the same, implying that the skewness channel is weak.
Related, Kapadia (2006) and Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010) show that the IVOL puzzle
is consistent with investor preference for positive skewness in stock returns. They suggest IVOL
as a proxy for skewness. Thus, a more skewed stock, hence higher IVOL stock is preferred, and
requires a lower expected return. We measure skewness using daily returns, and each month we
sort stocks first on their skewness into two groups and then on IVOL with each skewness group.
Table B.10 reports the results. First, the IVOL effect exists in both low and high skewness group.
Raw and abnormal return of the zero cost IVOL portfolio do not seem very differentiated between
each group. In addition, our results are still robust, though the residual IVOL effect is somewhat
weaker in the high skewness group. Overall, these additional explanations could not explain our
findings. The IVOL puzzle is driven by the systematic variation via the volatility and uncertainty
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channels, and the residual IVOL is positively related to the expected return.
3.6.3 Uncertainty and Volatility
Finally, we discuss connections between uncertainty and return volatility. Our results show
that the common fluctuations of IVOL are closely related to aggregate uncertainty, measured by
common factors of analyst earnings forecast dispersions. Then, does uncertainty affect idiosyn-
cratic fluctuations of IVOL (r−IVOL) as well? We suspect that r−IVOL is related more closely
to firm-specific level of uncertainties, given that m−IVOL captures macroeconomic and common
fluctuations. To answer this question, we compare m−IVOL and r−IVOL with the common and
residual components of earnings forecast dispersions, respectively. We report results in Table B.11.
We compute the average sizes of the forecast dispersions for each decile ofm−IVOL portfolios
and r−IVOL portfolios, denoted as DISP. That is, we investigate whether uncertainty (DISP) leads
to common or idiosyncratic fluctuations of IVOL. Table B.11 shows that a higher (lower)m−IVOL
group has higher (lower) DISP, but a higher (lower) r−IVOL group features lower (higher) values
of DISP. This implies that m−IVOL is positively correlated with uncertainty, but our measure of
idiosyncratic risk (r−IVOL) is negatively correlated to uncertainty in earnings, which is puzzling.
To further investigate this, we decompose DISP into the common part ( ˆDISP ) and the id-
iosyncratic part (Residual DISP). Panel A shows that the m−IVOL is positively associated with
the aggregate level of uncertainty ( ˆDISP ), consistent with our results in Tables 4 and 5. In ad-
dition, m−IVOL is not significantly related to the residual part of DISP. Taken together, we infer
that m−IVOL measures aggregate uncertainty reasonably well, and macroeconomic uncertainty
premium prevails through volatility channel.
On the other hand, Panel B shows that the residual portion of IVOL (r−IVOL) is negatively
related to the overall forecast dispersion (DISP ) or the fitted part of the dispersion ( ˆDISP ), but
positively associated with the residual part of the DISP . Firms that have higher idiosyncratic
risks (r−IVOL) are those who are less exposed to aggregate uncertainty, yet more vulnerable to
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Therefore, in conjunction with the results of Tables B.4 and B.5, this
finding gives evidence that the positive relation between r−IVOL and stock returns can result
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from the channel of idiosyncratic risk and uncertainty being priced. Thus, the results strongly
suggest that both common and idiosyncratic fluctuations of uncertainty play instrumental roles to
explain the cross section of stock returns.
3.7 Conclusion
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) find that monthly stock returns are negatively related to
the idiosyncratic volatility in the previous month. They view this finding as something of a puzzle.
In comparison with the cross-section of stock returns, the factor structure of the cross-section
of stock return volatility is much less known. In this paper, we study the extent to which return
volatilities are decomposed into common and idiosyncratic parts, using observable macroeconomic
and firm-specific variables. This enables us to examine whether aggregate variables that are known
to predict return-volatility and return-uncertainty relation can explain the systematic and firm-
specific variations in individual return volatility. Using observable variables helps to interpret the
results and reconcile alternative theories that seem to be at odds with each other. Our findings
suggest that a recursive preference model with ambiguity aversion, incomplete market, and an
intertemporal hedging motive is a good asset pricing model to study interactions between the cross-
section of stock returns and the cross-section of return volatilities. Expanding this line of analysis
to higher moments, especially skewness and kurtosis of stock returns is challenging but interesting
venues to future research.
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4. SUMMARY
In this dissertation, I study how ambiguity plays a role in the financial market, and how it is
linked to stock return volatility. In the first essay, I measure the degree of ambiguous information
regarding dividends and earnings on stock prices and study its impact on stock prices. The essay
uses two proxies to quantify qualitative and uncertain aspects of news. The main finding is that
stock returns response more strongly to bad news than good news. Furthermore, the magnitude
of the asymmetric effect enlarges when news becomes more ambiguous as measured by ambi-
guity proxies. The essay contributes to the literature by providing ambiguity proxies at the firm
level, which are useful to future research in finance and accounting. Moreover, it shows empirical
evidence consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion, providing insights into how investors
process information with uncertain value.
In the second essay, "Ambiguity, Macro Factors, and Stock Return Volatility", coauthored
with Hwagyun Kim, we study the extent to which return volatilities are decomposed into com-
mon and idiosyncratic parts, using observable macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. This
enables us to examine whether aggregate variables that are known to predict return-volatility and
return-uncertainty relation can explain the systematic and firm-specific variations in individual re-
turn volatility. We find that aggregate variables known to explain stock market volatility affect
the IVOL and portfolio returns sorted by IVOL. Teasing out the common IVOL part, the residual
IVOL is positively and significantly related to stock returns and the idiosyncratic portions of earn-
ings forecast dispersions. Our findings suggest that a recursive preference model with ambiguity
aversion, incomplete market, and an intertemporal hedging motive is a good asset pricing model to
study interactions between the cross-section of stock returns and the cross-section of return volatil-
ities. Expanding this line of analysis to higher moments, especially skewness and kurtosis of stock
returns is challenging but interesting venues to future research.
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APPENDIX A
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A.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Variable Definitions
This table defines all variables used in this paper.
Variables Definition
adjusted_net_tone No. of positive words − No. of negative wordsNo. of positive words + No. of negative words
net_tone No. of positive words − No. of negative wordsNo. of total words
Goodnews adjusted_net_tone if adjusted_net_tone > 0, and 0 otherwise.
Badnews adjusted_net_tone if adjusted_net_tone < 0, and 0 otherwise.
AMBnumseq 1− No. of numeric sequenceNo. of total words
AMBnumsym 1− No. of numeric symbolsNo. of total words
AMBunc No. of uncertain wordsNo. of total words
CER No. of certain wordsNo. of total words
AMBnetunc AMBunc - CER
No. of Articles the number of articles about a firm each day
CAR two-day (t,t+ 1) cumulative Fama and French (2015) five factors
and momentum factor model adjusted return over the news day t
∆V IX two-day change in the VIX immediately preceding the news win-
dow (t,t+ 1)
V IX_lag average level of VIX over the week prior to the news window
(t,t+ 1)
Size firm’s market equity value
Illiquidity Amihud (2002) illiquidity, 106 ∗ |return|DollarV olume
Return_lag firm’s return over the previous month leading up to the news win-
dow
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 Continued
Variables Definition
Past_Return_Dummy a dummy variable equal to 1 if Return_lag is negative, and 0
otherwise
Sentiment Baker and Wurgler (2006) Sentiment Index
DCAPE relative price-to-earnings ratio; monthly change in cyclically-
adjusted price-to-earnings ratio
EPUI Baker et al. (2016) Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Short Interest shares held short divided by shares outstanding
Institutional Ownership shares held by asset managers divided by shares outstanding
Div_Increase a dummy variable equal to 1 if the dividend change is positive
during the news window (t,t+1), and 0 otherwise
MTB market value of equity over the book value of equity
V ol_lag standard deviation of daily stock returns in one-year period end-
ing two months prior to the news window (t,t+1)
High− tech a dummy of 1 if firms in high technology industries (SIC codes
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 7371-7379 and 8731-8734)
Reg.Ind a dummy of 1 if firms in regulated industries (SIC codes 4812-
4813, 4833, 4841, 4811-4899, 4922-4924, 4931 and 4941)
Insider the fraction of total shares outstanding held by managers.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in the paper. News-related variables are constructed using
Factiva, and stock data is from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Panel A reports news variables summary
statistics at the news level and Panel C reports summary statistics across good and bad news. Definitions of good and
bad news are from Tetlock et al. (2008). Panel B reports other variables. All variables are defined as in Table A.1. The
sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Panel A: News Variables
Variables No. of Observation Mean Median Std. Dev.
adjusted_net_tone 59076 -0.080 0.000 0.579
net_tone 59076 -0.003 0.000 0.013
AMBnumseq 59076 0.922 0.927 0.038
AMBnumsym 59076 0.944 0.952 0.034
AMBunc 59076 0.004 0.003 0.006
AMBnetunc 59076 0.001 0.000 0.007
STR 59076 0.003 0.001 0.005
Panel B: Other Variables
Variables No. of Observation Mean Median Std. Dev.
No. of Articles 36968 1.652 1.000 1.139
CAR(%) 36968 -0.032 0.034 4.278
Size($m) 36968 43634 17055 65810
Illiquidity 36968 0.00019 0.00007 0.00035
Return_lag(%) 36968 0.580 0.952 8.093
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Table A.2 Continued
Panel C: News Variables by Type
Good News (n=12101) Bad News (n=17932)
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Diff.
adjusted_net_tone 0.546 0.339 -0.537 0.307 -1.082∗∗∗
net_tone 0.008 0.006 -0.012 0.009 -0.021∗∗∗
AMBnumseq 0.922 0.030 0.928 0.032 0.005∗∗∗
AMBnumsym 0.944 0.027 0.950 0.028 0.006∗∗∗
AMBunc 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.001∗∗∗
AMBnetunc 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.001∗∗∗
STR 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.000∗∗∗
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Table A.3: Correlations among News Variables
This table reports correlation among news variables used in the paper. All variables are defined as in Table 1. The
sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
adjuseted_net_tone net_tone AMBnumseq AMBnumsym AMBunc CER
net_tone 0.823 1
AMBnumseq -0.038 -0.091 1
AMBnumsym -0.059 -0.101 0.896 1
AMBunc -0.086 -0.105 0.326 0.270 1
CER -0.009 -0.004 0.224 0.153 0.080 1
AMBnetunc -0.062 -0.080 0.103 0.108 0.732 -0.621
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Table A.4: Investors Responses to News
This Table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined as in Table
A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and
the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goodnews 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(6.24) (6.14) (6.77) (6.61)
Badnews 0.382∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗
(17.57) (18.12) (17.87) (18.37)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.005 0.029
(0.11) (0.62)
Size -0.014 0.064∗∗
(-0.18) (2.45)
Illiquidity 0.076 0.014
(1.50) (0.30)
Return_lag -0.116∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(-3.65) (-3.13)
No. of Articles -0.081∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(-3.16) (-3.07)
Test of Asymmetry
Goodnews - Badnews -0.252∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y I,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.021 0.022 0.017 0.018
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Table A.5: Investors Responses to News Incorporating Ambiguity Measures
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Ambiguity proxies are included. AMBnumseq
is the qualitative-based proxy and AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy. Other control variables are defined as
in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week
level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goodnews 0.125∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(6.00) (5.98) (5.80) (6.38) (6.45) (6.16)
Badnews 0.389∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(17.92) (18.07) (17.94) (18.15) (18.27) (18.15)
AMBnumseq -0.123∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗
(-5.19) (-5.38) (-5.65) (-5.84)
AMBnetunc 0.047∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(2.26) (2.79) (2.19) (2.79)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.032 0.030 0.033
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.68) (0.62) (0.70)
Size -0.019 -0.014 -0.019 0.084∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(-0.24) (-0.18) (-0.24) (3.20) (2.46) (3.24)
Illiquidity 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.009 0.014 0.009
(1.49) (1.49) (1.49) (0.21) (0.31) (0.21)
Return_lag -0.119∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗
(-3.74) (-3.64) (-3.73) (-3.25) (-3.12) (-3.25)
No. of Articles -0.085∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(-3.30) (-3.24) (-3.41) (-3.17) (-3.15) (-3.27)
Test of Asymmetry
Goodnews - Badnews -0.264∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ -0.274∗∗∗ -0.260∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y I,Y I,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.019
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Table A.6: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Ambiguity
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Ambiguity proxies are included. AMBnumseq
is the qualitative-based proxy and AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy. Other control variables are defined as
in Table 1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week
level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AMBnumseq AMBnumseq AMBnetunc AMBnetunc
Goodnews 0.120∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(5.75) (6.20) (5.70) (6.11)
Goodnews ∗Ambiguity -0.014 -0.009 -0.005 -0.019
(-0.67) (-0.41) (-0.27) (-0.97)
Badnews 0.403∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(18.34) (18.60) (18.01) (18.26)
Badnews ∗Ambiguity 0.081∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.031∗
(4.38) (4.52) (1.91) (1.76)
Ambiguity -0.033 -0.042 0.082∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(-1.00) (-1.28) (2.99) (3.13)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.009 0.035 0.006 0.030
(0.19) (0.74) (0.12) (0.62)
Size -0.025 0.086∗∗∗ -0.014 0.065∗∗
(-0.32) (3.26) (-0.18) (2.48)
Illiquidity 0.077 0.009 0.075 0.013
(1.53) (0.20) (1.48) (0.29)
Return_lag -0.123∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(-3.88) (-3.40) (-3.65) (-3.14)
No. of Articles -0.085∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
(-3.33) (-3.17) (-3.33) (-3.24)
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*Ambiguity)
- (Badnews +Badnews*Ambiguity) -0.378∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.024 0.020 0.023 0.018
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Table A.7: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Ambiguity: Alternative Ambiguity
Dictionaries
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy. In
column (1) and (2), uncertain words and certain words are defined by the overlap of Loughran and McDonald (2011)
list and the GI dictionary. Column (3) and (4) use a modified list of the overlap dictionary. Column (5) and (6) use
a combined dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011) list and the GI dictionary for uncertain and certain words.
Other control variables are defined as in Table 1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All standard
errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
LM-GI Overlap LM-GI Ovlap Modified LM-GI Combined
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goodnews 0.122∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(5.84) (6.36) (5.86) (6.30) (5.68) (6.17)
Goodnews ∗AMBnetunc -0.034∗ -0.034∗ 0.006 0.004 -0.036∗ -0.043∗∗
(-1.79) (-1.93) (0.28) (0.19) (-1.74) (-2.20)
Badnews 0.396∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(18.25) (18.50) (18.01) (18.26) (18.09) (18.30)
Badnews ∗AMBnetunc 0.036∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.034∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.030∗
(1.83) (1.98) (1.70) (1.80) (2.14) (1.68)
AMBnetunc 0.013 0.023 -0.021 -0.013 0.092∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.73) (-0.62) (-0.39) (3.17) (2.96)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.031 0.005 0.029
(0.12) (0.64) (0.13) (0.65) (0.12) (0.62)
Size -0.015 0.068∗∗∗ -0.016 0.069∗∗∗ -0.014 0.064∗∗
(-0.20) (2.59) (-0.21) (2.65) (-0.18) (2.47)
Illiquidity 0.076 0.013 0.076 0.012 0.075 0.013
(1.51) (0.28) (1.50) (0.26) (1.49) (0.29)
Return_lag -0.118∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(-3.69) (-3.17) (-3.71) (-3.19) (-3.65) (-3.14)
No. of Articles -0.083∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗
(-3.23) (-3.13) (-3.27) (-3.16) (-3.32) (-3.20)
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnetunc)
- (Badnews + Badnews*AMBnetunc) -0.344∗∗∗ -0.340∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.023 0.018 0.023 0.018 0.023 0.018
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Table A.8: Investors Responses to Non Press Release News Following Changes in Ambiguity
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables using non press release
news. Dependent variables are two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is
equal to normalized news tone when news tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Column (1)-(2) include
AMBnumseq , the qualitative-based proxy. AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy and included in Column (3)-
(4). Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All
standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AMBnumseq AMBnumseq AMBnetunc AMBnetunc
Goodnews 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(6.71) (6.85) (6.98) (7.08)
Goodnews ∗Ambiguity 0.009 0.016 0.019 0.007
(0.40) (0.70) (0.80) (0.29)
Badnews 0.428∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(17.09) (17.33) (16.92) (17.18)
Badnews ∗Ambiguity 0.103∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.035∗
(5.00) (5.21) (1.71) (1.74)
Ambiguity -0.032 -0.040 0.048 0.049
(-0.86) (-1.11) (1.34) (1.40)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.019 0.046 0.013 0.037
(0.35) (0.87) (0.24) (0.70)
Size -0.021 0.091∗∗∗ -0.008 0.067∗∗
(-0.25) (2.91) (-0.09) (2.19)
Illiquidity 0.062 -0.000 0.058 0.003
(1.08) (-0.00) (1.01) (0.06)
Return_lag -0.141∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(-3.85) (-3.48) (-3.57) (-3.15)
No. of Articles -0.119∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(-4.15) (-4.09) (-4.02) (-4.04)
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*Ambiguity)
- (Badnews +Badnews*Ambiguity) -0.337∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y
N 31509 31509 31509 31509
adj. R2 0.027 0.023 0.026 0.022
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Table A.9: Robustness Check: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Qualitative-
based Ambiguity Controlling Alternative Explanations
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. AMBnumseq , the qualitative-based proxy
is included as the Ambiguity proxy. Sentiment is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index DCAPE is the
change in cyclical-adjusted price-to-earnings-ratio. EPUI is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. MTB is the
market-to-book ratio. V ol_lag is the past stock volatility. Hi − tech is a dummy for High-tech firms. Reg.Ind is a
dummy for firms in regulated industries. Insider is the fraction of stock shares held by managers. Past_Return is
the firm’s return over the previous month leading up to the news window. Past_Return_Dummy is a dummy for
negative Past Return. Other control variables are defined as in Table 1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of
observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***,
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
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Table A.9 Continued
Panel A: Macro-level Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change_in_V IX Sentiment DCAPE EPUI
Goodnews 0.113∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(3.89) (6.01) (6.29) (6.04)
Goodnews ∗AMBnumseq -0.023 -0.017 -0.014 -0.021
(-1.05) (-0.76) (-0.63) (-0.97)
Badnews 0.404∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(13.47) (17.51) (17.66) (17.94)
Badnews ∗AMBnumseq 0.085∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(4.52) (4.72) (4.32) (4.43)
AMBnumseq -0.017 -0.010 -0.020 -0.018
(-0.51) (-0.30) (-0.60) (-0.54)
Alternative 0.007 -0.156∗ 0.075 0.065
(0.10) (-1.93) (1.09) (1.44)
Goodnews ∗Alternative 0.039 0.050∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.017
(0.98) (1.71) (-1.97) (0.66)
Badnews ∗Alternative -0.001 0.026 -0.073∗∗∗ 0.022
(-0.01) (1.06) (-2.95) (0.92)
Div_Increase 0.386∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
(3.03) (2.82) (2.90) (2.91)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.197∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(-3.21) (-2.95) (-3.01) (-3.10)
Badnews ∗Div_Increase -0.124 -0.090 -0.121 -0.128
(-1.11) (-0.82) (-1.08) (-1.16)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnumseq)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnumseq) -0.399∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.338∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 36741 35880 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.024
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Table A.9 Continued
Panel B: Withholding Bad News Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MTB V ol_lag Hi− tech Reg.Ind Insider
Goodnews 0.164∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(6.11) (5.72) (5.15) (6.11) (5.83)
Goodnews ∗AMBnumseq -0.027 -0.016 -0.024 -0.021 -0.022
(-1.00) (-0.76) (-1.11) (-0.95) (-0.97)
Badnews 0.482∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(17.24) (17.72) (17.70) (17.03) (17.31)
Badnews ∗AMBnumseq 0.107∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(4.34) (4.02) (4.49) (4.48) (4.53)
AMBnumseq -0.022 -0.035 -0.017 -0.021 -0.019
(-0.54) (-1.05) (-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.56)
Alternative -0.108∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ -0.279 -0.682∗∗∗ 0.133∗
(-2.13) (3.47) (-0.84) (-3.10) (1.81)
Goodnews ∗Alternative 0.077∗∗∗ 0.033 0.152∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.010
(3.19) (0.83) (1.82) (-2.68) (-0.36)
Badnews ∗Alternative -0.028 0.158∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.174∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(-0.98) (5.34) (-0.40) (-3.66) (2.98)
Div_Increase 0.264∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
(1.74) (3.24) (2.91) (3.01) (2.64)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.177∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(-2.41) (-3.14) (-3.04) (-3.10) (-2.85)
Badnews ∗Div_Increase -0.304∗∗ -0.070 -0.128 -0.126 -0.104
(-2.24) (-0.63) (-1.15) (-1.13) (-0.91)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnumseq)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnumseq) -0.452∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 27649 36925 36968 36968 34190
adj. R2 0.029 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.025
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Table A.9 Continued
Panel C: Other Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Past_Return Past_Return_Dummy Short_Sale_Constraint
Goodnews 0.138∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(6.19) (4.19) (6.84)
Goodnews ∗AMBnumseq -0.019 -0.021 -0.011
(-0.90) (-0.99) (-0.51)
Badnews 0.398∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(17.95) (12.22) (16.99)
Badnews ∗AMBnumseq 0.081∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(4.32) (4.25) (4.36)
AMBnumseq -0.018 -0.018 -0.034
(-0.54) (-0.54) (-1.01)
Alternative -0.181∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(-3.59) (3.18)
Goodnews ∗Alternative -0.028 0.044
(-0.95) (1.10)
Badnews ∗Alternative -0.057∗∗ 0.098∗∗
(-2.12) (2.35)
Div_Increase 0.373∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗
(2.92) (2.88) (2.79)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.191∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(-3.10) (-3.03) (-2.72)
Badnews ∗Div_Increase -0.126 -0.128 -0.099
(-1.14) (-1.16) (-0.88)
Continued on next page
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Table A.9 Continued
Panel C Continued
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Past_Return Past_Return_Dummy Short_Sale_Constraint
Table Continued
Short Interest 0.188∗∗∗
(2.93)
Short Interest ∗Goodnews 0.041
(1.40)
Short Interest ∗Badnews 0.070∗∗
(2.36)
Institutional Ownership 0.057
(0.86)
Institutional Ownership ∗Goodnews 0.033
(1.41)
Institutional Ownership ∗Badnews 0.066∗∗∗
(2.81)
Return_lag -0.121∗∗∗
(-3.69)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnumseq)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnumseq) -0.360∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 36968 36968 34387
adj. R2 0.024 0.024 0.026
77
Table A.10: Robustness Check: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Uncertainty-
based Ambiguity Controlling Alternative Explanations
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. AMBnetunc, the uncertainty-based proxy
is included as the Ambiguity proxy. Sentiment is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index DCAPE is the
change in cyclical-adjusted price-to-earnings-ratio. EPUI is the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. MTB is the
market-to-book ratio. V ol_lag is the past stock volatility. Hi − tech is a dummy for High-tech firms. Reg.Ind is a
dummy for firms in regulated industries. Insider is the fraction of stock shares held by managers. Past_Return is
the firm’s return over the previous month leading up to the news window. Past_Return_Dummy is a dummy for
negative Past Return. Other control variables are defined as in Table 1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of
observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***,
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
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Table A.10 Continued
Panel A: Macro-level Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change_in_V IX Sentiment DCAPE EPUI
Goodnews 0.117∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
(3.94) (5.96) (6.21) (5.99)
Goodnews ∗AMBnetunc -0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.005
(-0.29) (0.02) (0.05) (-0.24)
Badnews 0.398∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗
(13.18) (16.96) (17.17) (17.49)
Badnews ∗AMBnetunc 0.035∗ 0.034∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.032∗
(1.96) (1.87) (2.07) (1.80)
AMBnetunc 0.082∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.54) (2.84) (2.83)
Alternative 0.011 -0.168∗∗ 0.089 0.066
(0.16) (-2.07) (1.28) (1.45)
Goodnews ∗Alternative 0.036 0.053∗ -0.063∗∗ 0.020
(0.92) (1.83) (-2.13) (0.78)
Badnews ∗Alternative 0.003 0.023 -0.074∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.07) (0.95) (-2.96) (0.98)
Div_Increase 0.383∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(3.07) (2.85) (2.98) (2.97)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.181∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(-3.03) (-2.80) (-2.89) (-2.94)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.159 -0.130 -0.153 -0.162
(-1.45) (-1.20) (-1.40) (-1.49)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnetunc)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnetunc) -0.322∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 36741 35880 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.023
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Table A.10 Continued
Panel B: Withholding Bad News Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MTB V ol_lag Hi− tech Reg.Ind Insider
Goodnews 0.167∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(6.05) (5.73) (5.09) (6.02) (5.89)
Goodnews ∗AMBnetunc -0.008 0.000 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(-0.31) (0.01) (-0.29) (-0.16) (-0.21)
Badnews 0.474∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(16.66) (17.23) (17.31) (16.57) (16.78)
Badnews ∗AMBnetunc 0.038∗ 0.035∗ 0.034∗ 0.035∗ 0.020
(1.65) (1.94) (1.87) (1.96) (1.07)
AMBnetunc 0.089∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(2.63) (2.44) (2.92) (2.90) (2.12)
Alternative -0.105∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ -0.266 -0.706∗∗∗ 0.134∗
(-2.08) (3.24) (-0.81) (-3.20) (1.82)
Goodnews ∗Alternative 0.075∗∗∗ 0.037 0.155∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.010
(3.12) (0.92) (1.86) (-2.64) (-0.36)
Badnews ∗Alternative -0.028 0.159∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.171∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(-0.97) (5.35) (-0.40) (-3.57) (2.95)
Div_Increase 0.263∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(1.78) (3.44) (2.95) (3.09) (2.71)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.160∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗
(-2.24) (-3.07) (-2.85) (-2.94) (-2.71)
Badnews ∗Div_Increase -0.342∗∗ -0.097 -0.163 -0.160 -0.142
(-2.57) (-0.89) (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.26)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnetunc)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnetunc) -0.353∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗ -0.281∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 27649 36925 36968 36968 34190
adj. R2 0.028 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.024
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Table A.10 Continued
Panel C: Other Explanations
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Past_Return Past_Return_Dummy Short_Sale_Constraint
Goodnews 0.140∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(6.10) (4.16) (6.83)
Goodnews ∗AMBnetunc -0.005 -0.004 0.012
(-0.24) (-0.20) (0.58)
Badnews 0.395∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗
(17.48) (11.83) (16.56)
Badnews ∗AMBnetunc 0.033∗ 0.032∗ 0.016
(1.82) (1.80) (0.91)
AMBnetunc 0.079∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(2.86) (2.85) (1.96)
Alternative -0.181∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(-3.59) (3.19)
Goodnews ∗Alternative -0.029 0.046
(-0.98) (1.15)
Badnews ∗Alternative -0.063∗∗ 0.106∗∗
(-2.33) (2.54)
Div_Increase 0.372∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.94) (2.95)
Goodnews ∗Div_Increase -0.177∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(-2.96) (-2.87) (-2.66)
Badnews ∗Div_Increase -0.159 -0.161 -0.134
(-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.20)
Continued on next page
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Table A.10 Continued
Panel C Continued
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3)
Past_Return Past_Return_Dummy Short_Sale_Constraint
Table Continued
Short Interest 0.188∗∗∗
(2.94)
Short Interest ∗Goodnews 0.041
(1.39)
Short Interest ∗Badnews 0.077∗∗∗
(2.61)
Institutional Ownership 0.046
(0.69)
Institutional Ownership ∗Goodnews 0.034
(1.47)
Institutional Ownership ∗Badnews 0.052∗∗
(2.20)
Return_lag -0.114∗∗∗
(-3.48)
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*AMBnetunc)
- (Badnews +Badnews*AMBnetunc) -0.293∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
Fixed Effect F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 36968 36968 34387
adj. R2 0.023 0.023 0.025
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Table A.11: Robustness Check: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Ambiguity
Controlling for All Explanations
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables using different ambiguity
measures. Dependent variables are two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews)
is equal to normalized news tone when news tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Column (1)-(2) include
AMBnumseq , the qualitative-based proxy. AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy and included in Column (3)-
(4). Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All
standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AMBseq AMBseq AMBnetunc AMBnetunc
Goodnews 0.223∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(4.82) (4.67) (4.99) (4.85)
Goodnews ∗Ambiguity 0.004 0.002 0.026 0.009
(0.14) (0.08) (0.99) (0.35)
Badnews 0.489∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(11.45) (11.46) (11.02) (11.03)
Badnews ∗Ambiguity 0.110∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.026 0.024
(4.13) (4.41) (1.07) (0.97)
Ambiguity -0.050 -0.051 0.036 0.030
(-1.12) (-1.16) (0.98) (0.87)
Div_Increase Yes Yes Yes Yes
Change_in_V IX Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sentiment Yes Yes Yes Yes
DCAPE Yes Yes Yes Yes
EPUI Yes Yes Yes Yes
MTB Yes Yes Yes Yes
V ol_lag Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hi− tech Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg.Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insider Yes Yes Yes Yes
Past_Return Yes Yes Yes Yes
Short Interest Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institutional Ownership Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls (See Table 4) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*Ambiguity)
- (Badnews +Badnews*Ambiguity) -0.372∗∗∗ -0.394∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y
N 23378 23391 23378 23391
adj. R2 0.037 0.031 0.035 0.029
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Table A.12: Return Volatility and Ambiguity
This tables reports the results from regressions of news-day return volatility on firm ambiguity measures and control
variables. Dependent variables are annual stock return volatility for all news day in that year. Column (1) includes
AMBnumseq , the qualitative-based proxy. AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy and included in Column (2).
Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All
standard errors are clustered at firm-year level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable Return Volatility on News-Day
(1) (2) (3)
AMBnumseq 0.113∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(4.81) (4.68)
AMBnetunc 0.240∗∗ 0.195
(2.01) (1.62)
Annual_volatility_lag 0.741∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(8.35) (8.73) (8.33)
Size -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(-4.52) (-4.85) (-4.55)
Fixed Effects F,Y F,Y F,Y
N 5943 5943 5943
adj. R2 0.365 0.362 0.365
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Figure A.1: Top 25 Most Frequently Occurring Positive and Negative Words
This figure shows the most frequently occurring positive and negative words defined in Loughran
and McDonald (2011).
(a) Positive Words
(b) Negative Words
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Figure A.2: Top 25 Most Frequently Occurring Uncertain and Certain Words
This figure shows the most frequently occurring uncertain and certain words defined in Loughran
and McDonald (2011).
(a) Uncertain Words
(b) Certain (Strong Modal) Words
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A.2 Appendix for Section 2
Table A.13: Example of Words List
This table lists top 30 most frequently occurring words in the sample for positive, negative and uncertain category in
Loughran and McDonald (2011). Complete lists for certain words are shown in the last two columns.
Positive Negative Uncertain Certain
strong loss could will
gains losses may best
gain decline nearly highest
better closed risk must
despite cut approximately clearly
improved restructuring believe lowest
benefit late risks always
good declined anticipated never
positive weak roughly strongly
boost hurt believes definitely
improvement against might undoubtedly
boosted dropped predicted unparalleled
stronger weaker uncertainties undisputed
improve weakness possible definitively
leading concerns differ unequivocally
strength negative almost unequivocal
outstanding declines anticipates unsurpassed
improving closing exposure unambiguously
progress litigation revised uncompromising
profitability lost volatility
able discontinued uncertainty
opportunities impairment cautious
favorable difficult fluctuations
benefited claims assumptions
greater sharply appears
effective poor pending
gained slowdown probably
improvements warned anticipate
highest problems preliminary
profitable slow intangible
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Table A.14: Investors Responses to News Incorporating Ambiguity Measures: Alternative Tone
Measure
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to net_tonewhen net_tone
is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and
N is the number of observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported
in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan.
2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goodnews 0.197∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(7.92) (7.98) (7.95) (7.94)
Badnews 0.527∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(18.42) (19.07) (18.88) (19.48)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.006 0.031
(0.13) (0.66)
Size -0.035 0.067∗∗
(-0.45) (2.58)
Illiquidity 0.085∗ 0.022
(1.68) (0.49)
Return_lag -0.129∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(-4.06) (-3.57)
No. of Articles -0.082∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗
(-3.22) (-3.11)
Test of Asymmetry
Goodnews - Badnews -0.330∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗
Fixed Effect F,Y F,Y I,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.024 0.025 0.020 0.021
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Table A.15: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Ambiguity: Alternative Ambigu-
ity Measure
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables. Dependent variables are
two-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews) is equal to adjuseted_net_tone
when adjuseted_net_tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. AMBnumsym is the alternative qualitative-
based proxy and included. Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number
of observations. All standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses;
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec.
2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(0,+1)
(1) (2)
AMBnumsym AMBnumsym
Goodnews 0.132∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(6.05) (6.48)
Goodnews ∗Ambiguity 0.0405∗ 0.0422∗
(1.82) (1.93)
Badnews 0.397∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗
(17.83) (18.07)
Badnews ∗Ambiguity 0.107∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(5.69) (6.03)
Ambiguity -0.0175 -0.0157
(-0.54) (-0.49)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.00877 0.0343
(0.19) (0.73)
Size -0.0273 0.0788∗∗∗
(-0.35) (3.00)
Illiquidity 0.0768 0.0100
(1.53) (0.22)
Return_lag -0.126∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(-3.95) (-3.47)
No. of Articles -0.0826∗∗∗ -0.0782∗∗∗
(-3.23) (-3.08)
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*Ambiguity)
- (Badnews + Badnews*Ambiguity) -0.332∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.024 0.020
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Table A.16: Investors Responses to News Following Changes in Ambiguity: 3-Day Event Window
This table reports the results from regressions of returns on firm news and control variables using different ambiguity
measures. Dependent variables are three-day cumulative abnormal returns over every news day. Goodnews (Badnews)
is equal to normalized news tone when news tone is larger (smaller) than 0, and 0 otherwise. Column (1)-(2) include
AMBnumseq , the qualitative-based proxy. AMBnetunc is the uncertainty-based proxy and included in Column (3)-
(4). Other control variables are defined as in Table A.1. FE is fixed effects, and N is the number of observations. All
standard errors are clustered at firm-week level, and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2015.
Dependent Variable CAR(-1,+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AMBnumseq AMBnumseq AMBnetunc AMBnetunc
Goodnews 0.132∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(5.63) (5.87) (5.71) (5.93)
Goodnews ∗Ambiguity -0.019 -0.013 -0.007 -0.021
(-0.79) (-0.57) (-0.31) (-0.94)
Badnews 0.451∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(18.53) (18.75) (18.33) (18.55)
Badnews ∗Ambiguity 0.085∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.030 0.027
(4.06) (4.05) (1.51) (1.38)
Ambiguity -0.071∗ -0.079∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(-1.90) (-2.14) (2.41) (2.59)
Controls:
V IX_lag 0.122∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(2.28) (2.83) (2.20) (2.71)
Size -0.044 0.113∗∗∗ -0.032 0.085∗∗∗
(-0.49) (3.74) (-0.35) (2.87)
Illiquidity 0.087 0.014 0.086 0.019
(1.63) (0.29) (1.59) (0.40)
Return_lag 0.285∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(7.79) (8.26) (8.00) (8.49)
No. of Articles -0.081∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(-3.04) (-2.90) (-2.97) (-2.91)
Test of Asymmetry
(Goodnews + Goodnews*Ambiguity)
- (Badnews +Badnews*Ambiguity) -0.423∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗
Fixed Effects F,Y I,Y F,Y I,Y
N 36968 36968 36968 36968
adj. R2 0.029 0.025 0.028 0.023
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An Example of News Covered in Factiva
Sherwin-Williams Earnings -3: Street Sees 2002 EPS $2.01
241 words
22 October 2002
09:54
Dow Jones News Service
English
(Copyright (c) 2002, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.)
Sherwin-Williams warned that weak domestic economic activity, which hurt 2001 sales and profits,
remains sluggish.
Specifically, the domestic manufacturing sector continues to delay maintenance spending, hurting in-
dustrial maintenance sales. In addition, low domestic factory output that is slowing the economic recovery
is affecting product finishes and automotive original equipment manufacturer sales.
The company expects fourth-quarter sales to rise about 2.5% to 3.5% from year-ago sales of about $1.13
billion. This growth would put fourth-quarter sales between about $1.16 billion and $1.17 billion.
As a result, annual sales are expected to be 2.4% and 2.8% higher than last year’s roughly $5.07 billion
in sales. Full-year sales would, therefore, come to between roughly $5.19 billion and $5.21 billion.
Achieving anticipated sales would result in earnings of $2.00 to $2.06 a share, excluding the effect of
adopting of SFAS 142. After adding back goodwill amortization expense to 2001 net income would have
been $1.83 a share.
For 2002, First Call expects Sherwin-Williams to earn $2.01 a share, on about $5.18 billion in sales.
Sherwin-Williams said it has reduced its working capital to levels that it plans to maintain in line with
its sales performance, while remaining poised for any increase in customer demand.
-Carrie Kocik; Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-5388
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics of Variables
Panels A through D report summary statistics for monthly variables used in the paper. Panel A presents those
related to stock returns, which are available from the CRSP database. In particular, Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is
measured relative to the Fama and French (1993) model, following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Panel
B displays the summary statistics of the variables used to link to stock return volatility. The first group refers to
macroeconomic variables, which are calculated based on Schwert (1989). Volatility of the monetary base growth
(∆Mvol), of the industry production growth (∆IP vol) and of the CPI change (INFLvol) are estimated from
equation (3.27). Recession Indicator (Recession) is equal to 1 in a recessionary period or 0 in an expansionary period.
Credit spread (Yield) is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and Aaa yield from the Federal
Reserve Board. Term spread (Term) is the spread between 10-year treasury bond and 1-year treasury bond yield
from the Federal Reserve Board. The second group (Corporate) contains corporate variables which are obtained
from the CRSP-Compustat Merged database. ME is the firm market value in millions. BE/ME is the book to market
ratio, CP refers to the Cash flow to Price ratio, and DP refers to the Dividend to Price ratio. Leverage (Lev) refers
to the book value of long term debt divided by book assets. Trading Volume (Tvlm) is the ratio of the number of
shares traded over total shares outstanding. Panels C and D refer to the data on analyst forecast dispersion. Analysts
forecast dispersion is from I/B/E/S Merged database and is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by
the absolute value of the mean earnings forecast. The sample period is July 1963 to December 2012. Panel D reports
the averages of adjusted R2 explained by the common dispersion factors. Each month we regress firm-level analyst
forecast dispersion (Dispit) on up to first ten common factors from the asymptotic principal component analysis and
obtain adjusted R2
Dispit = αi + β
′
iFt + uit,
where Ft are common factors obtained from asymptotic principle component analysis. Dispit is the standard
deviation of EPS forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean EPS forecast.
Panel A: Return Characteristics
Number of Observations Mean Median Std. Dev.
Return 2880109 0.011 0.000 0.183
Return Volatility 2843406 0.033 0.026 0.031
IVOL 2843104 0.029 0.022 0.029
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Table B.1 Continued
Panel B: Variables Related to Stock Market Volatility
Variables Number of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Macro MKTvol 595 0.009 0.007 0.005
∆Mvol 551 0.005 0.003 0.009
∆IPvol 595 0.007 0.006 0.002
INFLvol 595 0.002 0.002 0.000
Recession 595 0.139 0.000 0.347
Yield 595 0.011 0.009 0.005
Term 595 0.010 0.009 0.012
Corporate ME (in millions) 2445597 1325.217 89.200 8934.640
BE/ME 2436642 0.959 0.348 28.801
CP 1909502 -0.002 0.008 0.297
DP 2288756 0.001 0.000 0.030
Lev 2142579 0.059 0.039 0.087
Tvlm 2558468 0.092 0.041 0.212
Panel C: Analysts Forecast Dispersion
Number of Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Analysts Forecast Dispersion 1133678 0.210 0.046 1.338
Panel D: Average Explained Variance by Common Dispersion Factors
Number of factors 1 2 3 4
Average Adjusted R2 0.124 0.195 0.238 0.270
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Table B.2: Portfolios Sorted by Idiosyncratic Volatility Relative to Fama French 3 Factors
This table replicates the Table 6 of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) and shows some robustness checks. In
each month, we sort stocks based on IVOL relative to the Fama and French (1993) model. Portfolios are formed every
month based on IVOL over the previous month. IVOL Ranking 1 (5) refers to the portfolio of stocks with the lowest
(highest) IVOL. The statistics in the columns labeled Mean and Std. Dev. are measured in monthly percentage and
apply only to total returns. The row "5-1" refers to the difference in monthly returns (alphas) between portfolio with
the highest IVOL and portfolio with the lowest IVOL. The Alpha reports constants to the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model (FF-3F), respectively. For Panel C, we split our samples
into recession period and expansion period according to NBER Recession Indicator. For Panel D, we restrict our
samples with prices above $1. Robust Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets. The sample
period is July 1963 to December 2012.
Panel A: July 1963 to December 2000
IVOL Ranking Mean Std.Dev. CAPM Alpha FF-3F Alpha
1 1.036 3.785 0.097 0.034
[1.35] [0.72]
2 1.126 4.685 0.071 0.058
[1.53] [1.05]
3 1.214 5.824 0.043 0.069
[0.42] [0.90]
4 0.820 7.134 -0.441 -0.389
[-2.59] [-3.81]
5 -0.014 8.134 -1.278 -1.310
[-4.95] [-8.00]
5-1 -1.050 -1.375 -1.344
[-3.08] [-4.37] [-7.06]
Panel B: July 1963 to December 2012
IVOL Ranking Mean Std.Dev. CAPM Alpha FF-3F Alpha
1 0.887 3.780 0.101 0.061
[1.78] [1.46]
2 0.941 4.921 0.0332 0.006
[0.78] [0.13]
3 1.030 6.094 0.022 0.024
[0.25] [0.35]
4 0.694 7.653 -0.413 -0.412
[-2.54] [-3.64]
5 0.016 8.818 -1.119 -1.218
[-4.83] [-7.44]
5-1 -0.870 -1.220 -1.279
[-2.70] [-4.42] [-6.78]
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Table B.2 continued
Panel C: IVOL Puzzle with Business Cycles
H-L sorted on FF-3F Alpha in Recession FF-3F Alpha in Expansion
(NBER Recession=1) (NBER Recession=0)
IVOL IV OLit -2.264 -1.007
[-2.71] [-5.78]
Panel D: IVOL Puzzle Excluding Penny Stocks
H-L sorted on FF-3F Alpha
IVOL IV OLit -1.106
[-6.48]
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Table B.3: Explaining Market Return Volatility
This table describes the determinants of the market return volatility. We use the following regression to obtain coeffi-
cient estimates
Ln(MKT vol) = α+ β′iXt + uit.
Dependent variable is the log of market volatility (MKT vol). It is the standard deviation of excess market return
within each month. The vector of right hand side variables, denoted as X are the logarithm of the variables defined in
Table B.1. Robust Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
α -2.763 -3.092 -2.396 -2.682 5.263 6.129
[-1.78] [-2.15] [-1.86] [-1.97] [2.99] [3.09]
βˆ∆Mvol 0.100 0.034 0.024 0.026 0.043 0.021
[4.24] [1.47] [1.00] [1.10] [1.97] [0.92]
βˆ∆IP vol 0.081 0.070 0.080 0.066 0.058 0.102
[1.29] [1.40] [1.53] [1.34] [1.32] [2.24]
βˆINFLvol 0.116 -0.064 -0.030 -0.048 -0.065 -0.069
[1.08] [-0.69] [-0.30] [-0.50] [-1.03] [-1.03]
βˆRecession 0.387 0.222 0.278 0.250 0.212 0.206
[3.85] [3.15] [3.70] [3.39] [2.60] [2.50]
βˆY ield 0.360 0.415 0.409 0.171 0.234
[3.35] [3.88] [3.76] [1.66] [2.25]
βˆTerm -0.011
[-0.40]
βˆCP -0.226 -0.088 -0.047 -0.045
[-2.09] [-0.76] [-0.54] [-0.52]
βˆDP -0.302 -0.250 0.025 -0.041
[-2.64] [-1.98] [0.20] [-0.33]
βˆLev -1.020 -0.491 0.026 -0.051 2.447 2.913
[-1.87] [-1.04] [0.06] [-0.11] [4.28] [4.46]
βˆTvlm 0.208 0.225 0.200 0.624 0.649
[3.64] [4.44] [3.54] [5.90] [5.33]
βˆDisp1 4.166 4.100
[2.86] [2.65]
βˆDisp2 -0.192 -0.316
[-0.24] [-0.40]
βˆDisp3 6.130 5.527
[7.60] [5.99]
βˆDisp4 -0.294 -0.415
[-0.46] [-0.65]
AdjR2 0.1958 0.3355 0.3797 0.3428 0.4705 0.5156
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Table B.4: Portfolios Sorted on Macroeconomic Determinants of Return Volatilities
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by the part of the IVOL fitted by macroeconomic variables and the residual
part of the IVOL. We first regress the time series of individual stock IVOL on candidate variables (Xt) and obtain
coefficients estimates
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt) and are defined
in Table B.1. We then sort stocks based on the size of γˆjiX
j
t over the previous month and form zero cost portfolios
(H-L). These portfolios are held for one month. The table reports zero cost portfolios mean return and alpha with
respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in percentage. Robust Newey and West (1987) t-statistics
are reported in square brackets.
H-L sorted on Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit -1.646 -2.063
[-3.59] [-6.42]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.722 0.668
[3.09] [2.92]
Aggregate Variables Explaining IVOL γˆi1∆Mvolt 0.112 0.017
[0.65] [0.08]
γˆi2∆IP volt 0.039 -0.123
[0.26] [-0.86]
γˆi3INFLvolt 0.246 0.049
[1.26] [0.27]
γˆi4Recessiont -0.041 -0.228
[-0.10] [-0.51]
γˆi5Y ieldt 0.043 -0.044
[0.21] [-0.22]
γˆi6Termt -0.238 -0.310
[-1.81] [-2.22]
γˆi7CPt 0.242 0.246
[1.46] [1.14]
γˆi8DPt -0.409 -0.521
[-3.65] [-4.71]
γˆi9Levt -0.223 -0.357
[-1.18] [-1.93]
γˆi10Tvlmt -0.679 -0.751
[-3.98] [-4.30]
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Table B.5: Portfolios Sorted on IVOL Fitted by Macroeconomic Variables and the Common Fac-
tors of Analyst Forecast Dispersions
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by the part of the IVOL fitted by macroeconomic variables, the common
factors of analyst forecast dispersions and the residual part of the IVOL. We first regress the time series of individual
stock IVOL on candidate variables (Xt) and obtain coefficients estimates
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, Disp1t , Disp
2
t ,
Disp3t , Disp
4
t ) and are defined in Table B.1. We then sort stocks based on the size of γˆ
j
iX
j
t over the previous month
and form zero cost portfolios (H-L). These portfolios are held for one month. The table reports zero cost portfolios
mean return and alpha with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in percentage. The last two
rows report the results from sorting stocks based on the size of the sum of contributions to return volatilities by
macroeconomic variables (MacV ) and common components of analyst dispersions, respectively. Robust Newey and
West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
H-L sorted on Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit -1.374 -1.617
[-2.84] [-4.03]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.534 0.549
[2.13] [2.22]
Aggregate Variables Explaining IVOL γˆi1∆Mvolt -0.133 -0.288
[-0.90] [-1.48]
γˆi2∆IP volt -0.094 -0.130
[-0.93] [-1.21]
γˆi3INFLvolt 0.342 0.285
[1.93] [1.84]
γˆi4Recessiont -0.269 -0.317
[-0.81] [-0.90]
γˆi5Y ieldt -0.350 -0.537
[-2.06] [-2.67]
γˆi6Termt -0.233 -0.328
[-1.92] [-2.66]
γˆi7CPt 0.037 0.081
[0.35] [0.70]
γˆi8DPt -0.312 -0.346
[-2.44] [-2.89]
γˆi9Levt 0.170 0.218
[1.37] [2.08]
γˆi10Tvlmt -0.180 -0.275
[-1.15] [-2.00]
SUM(γˆiDispjt ) 0.290 0.232
[2.40] [2.02]
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Table B.6: IVOL Zero Cost Portfolios Analysis
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the following regression
RHighIvolt −RLowIvolt = α+ b′xRγXt + it.
RγXt is the vector of factor-mimicking, zero-cost portfolio returns, constructed from first running the regression
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, {Dispjt}j=4j=1)
are defined in Table B.1. We then sort stocks on the size of γˆjiX
j
t over the previous month and R
γX
t is computed as
the stock return with the largest size of γˆjiX
j
t minus the stock return with the smallest size of γˆ
j
iX
j
t . Robust Newey
and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
α -1.220 -0.272 -0.278 -0.254 -0.250
[-4.42] [-1.14] [-1.15] [-1.01] [-1.00]
bmktex 0.771 0.148 0.144 0.152 0.164
[7.43] [2.10] [2.08] [2.12] [2.33]
b∆Mvol 0.020 0.046
[0.15] [0.34]
b∆IP vol -0.095 -0.082 -0.129
[-0.81] [-0.68] [-1.11]
bINFLvol -0.634 -0.638 -0.649 -0.651
[-5.46] [-5.36] [-5.35] [-5.39]
bY ield 0.442 0.450 0.446 0.454
[3.38] [3.54] [3.85] [3.87]
bTerm -0.091 -0.082 -0.109 -0.111
[-0.93] [-0.86] [-1.11] [-1.15]
bCP 0.250 0.249 0.266 0.253
[2.11] [2.10] [2.14] [2.06]
bDP -0.052 -0.026 0.008
[-0.44] [-0.22] [0.06]
bLev -0.917 -0.926 -0.927 -0.937
[-6.80] [-7.19] [-7.77] [-7.58]
bTvlm 0.741 0.756 0.751 0.729
[8.21] [7.55] [7.67] [7.18]
bDisp1 -0.271 -0.272 -0.218 -0.209
[-2.49] [-2.51] [-1.01] [-2.01]
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Table B.7: Portfolios Sorted by Alternative IVOL Measures
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by alternative IVOL measures. In each month, we use monthly data to
compute IVOL as the standard deviation of it by estimating the following GARCH(1,1) models
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + it (A)
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + b′xRγXt + it (B)
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + βiRMWRMWt + βiCMACMAt + it (C)
Rit −Rf = αi + βiMKTMKTt + βiSMBSMBt + βiHMLHMLt + βiRMWRMWt + βiCMACMAt + b′xRγXt + it (D) ,
it ∼ N(0, σ2it)
RγXt is constructed from first running the regression IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit, where Xt =
(∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, {Dispjt}j=4j=1) and are
defined in Table B.1. In each month, we sort stocks based on these alternative IVOL measures and portfolios are
formed every month based on IVOL over the previous month. The table reports zero cost portfolios mean return in
percentage. Robust Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Model H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return
A IV OLit -0.843
[-2.40]
B IV OLit -0.658
[-1.73]
C IV OLit -0.772
[-2.20]
D IV OLit -0.555
[-1.52]
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Table B.8: Portfolios Sorted by Decomposed IVOL Measures
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by decomposed IVOL measures. We use either the daily return without
dividends to calculate capital gain IVOL (IV OLx), or the difference between holding return and capital gain to
calculate cash flow IVOL (IV OLr). Next we regress the time series of IV OLx or IV OLr on candidate variables
(Xt) and obtain coefficients estimates
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, {Dispjt}j=4j=1)
and are defined in Table B.1. We then sort stocks based on the size of γˆjiX
j
t over the previous month and form zero
cost portfolios (H-L). These portfolios are held for one month. The table reports zero cost portfolios mean returns and
alphas with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in percentage. Robust Newey and West (1987)
t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
Capital Gain IVOL IV OLxit -0.888 -1.298
[-2.77] [-6.86]
Fitted Capital Gain IVOL ˆIV OLxit -1.460 -1.707
[-3.00] [-4.25]
Residual Capital Gain IVOL εˆxit 0.602 0.619
[2.38] [2.49]
Cash Flow IVOL IV OLrit 0.011 -0.341
[0.01] [-0.44]
Fitted Cash Flow IVOL ˆIV OLrit -0.365 -0.353
[-2.13] [-2.15]
Residual Cash Flow IVOL εˆrit 0.068 0.064
[0.30] [0.35]
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Table B.9: Lottery Preference: January and Non-January Month
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by IVOL, the fitted IVOL and residual IVOL in January and non-January
month. We split our monthly return data into January returns and non-January returns. Next we regress the time series
of IV OL on candidate variables (Xt) and obtain coefficients estimates for each subsample
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, {Dispjt}j=4j=1)
and are defined in Table B.1. We then sort stocks based on the size of γˆjiX
j
t over the previous month and form zero
cost portfolios (H-L). These portfolios are held for one month. The table reports zero cost portfolios mean returns and
alphas with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in percentage. Robust Newey and West (1987)
t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Panel A: January returns
H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
IVOL IV OLit 3.353 -0.034
[3.18] [-0.05]
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit 1.641 0.325
[2.09] [0.40]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.579 0.396
[1.64] [2.22]
Panel B: Non-January returns
H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
IVOL IV OLit -1.251 -1.412
[-3.71] [-7.35]
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit -1.758 -1.880
[-3.35] [-4.39]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.469 0.464
[1.93] [1.89]
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Table B.10: Portfolios Sorted by IVOL Determinants with Skewness
This table shows portfolio returns sorted by IVOL, the fitted IVOL and residual IVOL with return skewness. Each
month we sort stocks first on their skewness into two groups. Next we regress the time series of IV OL on candidate
variables (Xt) and obtain coefficients estimates
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, Y ieldt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, Dispt) and are
defined in Table B.1. We then sort stocks based on the size of γˆjiX
j
t over the previous month and form zero cost
portfolios (H-L) within each skewness group. These portfolios are held for one month. The table reports zero cost
portfolios mean returns and alphas with respect to the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model in percentage.
Robust Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Panel A: Low Skewness Group
H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
IVOL IV OLit -0.755 -1.178
[-2.48] [-6.69]
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit -1.752 -2.009
[-4.31] [-5.59]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.852 0.867
[3.79] [3.70]
Panel B: High Skewness Group
H-L sorted on Raw Mean Return FF-3F Alpha
IVOL IV OLit -0.933 -1.316
[-2.80] [-5.93]
Fitted IVOL ˆIV OLit -1.383 -1.628
[-2.86] [-4.16]
Residual IVOL εˆit 0.478 0.469
[1.72] [1.77]
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Table B.11: IVOL and Uncertainty
This table shows the analyst dispersion, the fitted dispersion and the idiosyncratic part of the dispersion of portfolios
sorted on IVOL, the fitted IVOL (m-IVOL) or the residual IVOL (r-IVOL). We regress the time series of IV OL on
candidate variables (Xt) and obtain coefficients estimates
IV OLit = αi + γ
′
iXt + εit,
where Xt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Recessiont, T ermt, Y ieldt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, {Dispjt}j=4j=1)
and are defined in Table B.1. The fitted part is the fitted IVOL (m-IVOL) and the residual εit is the residual
IVOL (r-ivol). We regress firm-level analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) on up to first ten common factors from the
asymptotic principal component analysis
DISPit = αi + β
′
iFt + uit,
where Ft are common factors obtained from asymptotic principal component analysis. ˆDISP is the fitted
part of the dispersion and uit is the idiosyncratic part of the dispersion (residual DISP). Robust Newey and West
(1987) t-statistics are reported in square brackets.
Panel A: Dispersions of Portfolios Sorted on the fitted IVOL (m-IVOL)
m-IVOL Rank DISP ˆDISP Residual DISP
1 (Low) 0.039 0.04 -0.001
2 0.066 0.066 0
3 0.092 0.099 -0.008
4 0.113 0.123 -0.01
5 0.147 0.155 -0.007
6 0.179 0.182 -0.002
7 0.21 0.235 -0.023
8 0.267 0.27 0
9 0.323 0.328 -0.003
10 (High) 0.457 0.469 -0.008
High-Low 0.418 0.429 -0.008
t-statistics [14.12] [15.94] [-0.55]
Panel B: Dispersions of Portfolios Sorted on residual IVOL (r-IVOL)
r-IVOL Rank DISP ˆDISP Residual DISP
1 (Low) 0.235 0.267 -0.03
2 0.138 0.154 -0.016
3 0.102 0.108 -0.005
4 0.087 0.092 -0.004
5 0.072 0.079 -0.006
6 0.07 0.078 -0.008
7 0.079 0.08 0
8 0.095 0.096 -0.001
9 0.135 0.123 0.013
10 (High) 0.181 0.175 0.006
High-Low -0.055 -0.092 0.036
t-statistics [-2.89] [-5.82] [2.25]
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Figure B.1: Distribution Figures
In Panel A, the distribution of IVOL/VOL is plotted. Each month we calculate the ratio of IVOL to return volatility
(IVOL/VOL) for each firm. We then average ratios to obtain firm level IVOL/VOL.
In Panel B, we first regress individual firm IVOL on market volatility (MKT vol)
IV OLit = αi + βiMKT volt + γ′Xt + uit
whereXt = (∆Mvolt,∆IP volt, INFLvolt, Y ieldt, T ermt, CPt, DPt, Levt, T vlmt, Disp1t , Disp
2
t , Disp
3
t , Disp
4
t )
and are defined in Table B.1, and plot the distribution of adjusted R2.
(a) Panel A
(b) Panel B
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Figure B.2: Time Series Plot of Macro Variables
This figure shows the times series plot of macro variables. Market Volatility is the standard deviation of excess market
return within each month. Volatility of the monetary base growth, of the industry production growth and of the CPI
change are estimated from equation (3.27). Yield is the spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond yield and Aaa
yield from the Federal Reserve Board. Term is the spread between 10-year Treasury rate and 1-year Treasury rate
from the Federal Reserve Board. The first common factor of analysts forecast dispersion is obtained from asymptotic
principle component analysis.
(a) Panel A Market Volatility (b) Panel B Monetary Base Growth Volatility
(c) Panel C Industry Production Growth Volatility (d) Panel D Inflation Volatility
(e) Panel E Yield Spread and Term Spread (f) Panel F The First Common Dispersion Factor
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Figure B.3: Time Series Plot of Aggregate Corporate Variables
This figure shows the times series plot of aggregate corporate variables. They are value weighted average of firm level
cash-flow-to-price-ratio, dividend-to-price ratio, leverage and trading volume. Leverage refers to the book value of
long term debt divided by book assets. Trading Volume is the ratio of the number of shares traded over total shares
outstanding.
(a) Panel A Cash-Flow-to-Price Ratio (b) Panel B Dividend-to-Price Ratio
(c) Panel C Leverage (d) Panel D Trading Volume
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